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ABSTRACT: Around the time of the Bicentennial Celebration of the U.S. 
Constitution’s framing, Sanford Levinson called upon Americans to renew 
our “constitutional faith.” This Article answers the call by explicating the 
ways in which two landmark constitutional law decisions—Marbury v. 
Madison and Brown v. Board of Education—have been used by jurists 
over the years to tend the American community of faith. Blending 
constitutional theory and the study of religious form, the Article argues that 
the legal symbols have become increasingly linked in the legal imagination 
even as they have come to signify very different sacred visions of law. One 
might think that Marbury, whose facts are unknown to the average 
American, has spawned an insulated message for legal insiders, while 
Brown, whose central holding is known by most citizens, acts as a unifying 
force in judicial thought. In fact, the opposite is true. Serving as a talisman 
of judicial might, Marbury evokes a popular myth of the reluctant 
lawgiver, as well as an entrenched juricentric belief in law. Despite its 
rehabilitation for ordinary Americans, in the minds of judges, Brown, now 
a generation removed from its date of decision, has come to refract lasting 
memories of social strife and the closing of the judicial mind. Ultimately, 
neither legal symbol, as it is understood today, offers a particularly uplifting 
ideal of justice or the judicial power. But what has grown grotesque can be 
shorn at the roots, and what has withered may yet be nursed back to vigor. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. B.A., University of 
California, Los Angeles; J.D., Yale Law School. Earlier incarnations of this paper were presented 
at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in Chicago, Illinois; at a forum 
commemorating the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education sponsored by the Wayne 
Morse Center for Law and Politics; and at the 2002 Joint Conference of Asian Pacific American 
Law Teachers and Western Regional Law Teachers of Color in Seattle, Washington. I extend my 
appreciation to Dave Douglas, Jill Hasday, John Leubsdorf, Jim Mooney, Winni Fallers Sullivan, 
and Timothy Zick for their wise and constructive thoughts, even when we have disagreed. Eric 
Kintner and the staff of the Iowa Law Review provided terrific editorial assistance. A Research 
Award from the University of Oregon facilitated my work on this project. 
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Somewhere, perhaps in an old dream, I have seen this place, or 
perhaps felt the feeling of this place. . . . This is ancient—and holy. 
—John Steinbeck, To A God Unknown 
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since Enlightenment Age philosophers cleaved Western thought in 
twain with the blade of reason, law has been located in the realm of the 
profane, its processes treated as distinct from that of the sacred. A popular 
Biblical saying, “‘Pay Caesar what belongs to Caesar—and God what belongs 
to God,’” has done much to disable our skill at discerning the similarities 
between the sovereign and the sacred.1 As whispered by modernity’s 
keepers, law is one thing and religion another; law exudes rationality and 
deals in the secular, while faith is an unruly force beyond law’s ken. 
In actuality, life under law not only owes an enormous debt to our 
spiritual and myth-based traditions, it also continues to share much of its 
basic texture with religious existence. Law prizes texts, ceremony, and relics; 
installs iconic figures and prophets; and suffers few contenders for its 
affections. Like religion, law knits together disparate groups of believers into 
a single community that transcends human frailty and the obstacles of time. 
On occasion, American leaders have glimpsed the inescapably sacral quality 
of law and paid homage to it. Standing on the blood-soaked battlefield at 
Gettysburg in 1863, Abraham Lincoln spoke movingly of the soldiers who 
consecrated the earth through their sacrifice and urged the living to 
dedicate themselves to the “unfinished work” of a “new birth of freedom.”2 
It is said that we peer into the very soul of the law when we ask exacting 
questions about its canonical decisions.3 Indeed, the contours of our 
1. Mark 12:17 (The New Jerusalem Bible). When Jesus of Nazareth reportedly was asked
by a group of Pharisees and Herodians whether his teachings permitted taxes to be paid to 
Caesar, his ingenious answer momentarily deflected charges of insurrection while reinforcing 
the primacy of the sacred. For no person living in First Century Palestine would have seriously 
taken him to mean that God’s domain was in any way limited by Caesar’s reign. “Master,” those 
trying to trap him reportedly said to Jesus, “‘[w]e know that you are an honest man, that you are 
not afraid of anyone, because human rank means nothing to you, and that you teach the way of 
God in all honesty. Is it permissible to pay taxes to Caesar or not? Should we pay or not?’” Mark 
12:13–17; Matthew 22:15–22; Luke 20:20–26. Jesus’ answer, which shows a flash of anger at the 
“hypocrisy” of his questioners, deftly broadened the inquiry: “‘Why are you putting me to the 
test? Hand me a denarius and let me see it. . . . Whose portrait is this? Whose title?’” See id. at 
12:15–16. When they replied, “‘Caesar’s,’” Jesus then gave his answer emphasizing that one’s 
debt to God, like that owed to Caesar, would have to be repaid. Id. at 12:17. 
2. President Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863),
reprinted in LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 536 (1989). 
3. See LEGAL CANONS 3 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000) (“The study of
canons and canonicity is the key to the secrets of a culture and its characteristic modes of 
thought.”); see also Jill E. Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 826–27 (2004) 
(positing a theory of canonization that includes leading cases as well as recurring “stories and 
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constitutional faith can be gleaned through diligent study of the landmark 
controversies in Marbury v. Madison4 or Brown v. Board of Education.5 But it is 
far more important how these two cases are assembled in our own time to 
sustain the symbolic life of the law. Accordingly, I am more interested in 
how these rulings are utilized as short-hands to cultivate legal belief than in 
whether a jurist’s use of either ruling is faithful to the original holding. My 
focus is on the descriptive, paying close attention to the actual architecture 
of symbolic discourse, the purposes with which it has been engaged, and 
what these discursive patterns reveal about the spiritual dimensions of 
American law. 
These two cases-turned-symbols are worthy of juxtaposition for three 
interlocking reasons. First, each decision involved a historically momentous 
exercise of judicial prerogative: Marbury was one of the earliest and most 
extravagant expositions; Brown was by far the most controversial.6 Second, 
cultural understandings of each ruling are today rhetorically manipulated by 
judges to extend or retract their sphere of influence to suit their specific 
needs and the times. That is to say, they have become active—even 
forceful—implements of institutional influence. Third, over time, the cases 
have become more tightly joined as two sides of the same coin in the minds 
of jurists during battles over the project of law itself. For these reasons, 
diachronic exploration of the rulings promises to offer the most insights 
about the interdependence of law and culture. 
What we discover is eye-opening. While each decision holds a secure 
place in the pantheon of legal wonders, the lasting influence of each ruling 
on the legal imagination could not be more different. Even a passing 
mention of Marbury recalls beginnings—the case is forever linked with a 
lawyer’s awakening to the wondrous potential of judicial power. More than 
ever, though, it has also become a vehicle for the perpetuation of popular 
culture, which insistently—even pathologically—hews to a court-centered 
view of law. 
Whenever Brown is referenced by jurists, a vastly different image-reel of 
experiential and conceptual associations is cued up. Mostly, we are invited to 
think of ends—the final crumbling of the dehumanizing racial caste system 
or the end of a romantic era in which judging consisted of solving private 
examples”). A work becomes part of the canon because it is representative of a discipline, 
because it offers usable material for those within a given field, or because the awareness of the 
work enhances cultural literacy. Any of these alone or in combination can spur the process of 
canonization. 
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. Indeed, largely for these reasons, Daniel Farber, Philip Frickey, and William Eskridge
use Brown as the primary case study for introducing the topic of constitutional decision-making 
in their casebook, asking students to learn Marbury only after they have encountered and deeply 
considered Brown. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE 
CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 50, 58 (2d ed. 1998). 
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disputes between aggrieved individuals rather than the reformation of 
government institutions.7 But perhaps most surprisingly, judges now 
routinely use Brown to symbolize the limits of law, to urge the conservation 
of institutional resources, and to perpetuate a vision of discretionary 
lawgiving. 
This Article is organized to ascertain what the contemporary jurist 
believes is significant about this pair of decisions. It also pays attention to 
how these cases are popularly received. Part II sketches a conception of 
American law that emphasizes its spiritual and communal dimensions. It 
then explores with greater particularity the capacity of path-breaking legal 
decisions to cultivate attachment to our legal order. I call this search for the 
symbolic modes of communal life constitutional iconography. 
The Article goes on to examine Marbury and Brown as symbols 
“shedding and gathering meaning over time and altering in form.”8 Part III 
examines these striking patterns in legal myth-making. Importantly, what 
judges think about these cases is not always in accord with how academics 
and citizens feel about them. These communities of legal faith have 
interacted in different ways to mold prevailing understandings of the two 
rulings. 
Notwithstanding sharp and regular academic warnings about the 
imperial judiciary, the Supreme Court employs Marbury to demand a form of 
constitutional obedience that is juricentric and hierarchical. Specifically, the 
decision has spawned a set of catechisms and tropes repeated to spread the 
myth of the judge as a reluctant lawgiver. It is a technique that plays to 
widespread support for court-driven mechanisms to protect basic rights. All 
of this suggests a greater degree of permeability between the ethos of the 
professional ranks and popular culture. 
On the other hand, the structures of meaning evoked by and revealed 
through poetic use of Brown are characterized by a somewhat greater 
interaction between judicial culture and academic culture. Part IV 
challenges the facile notion that Brown is universally seen as the “Holy Grail 
of racial justice.”9 Oddly, although the decision has undergone considerable 
rehabilitation when it comes to the population at large, it nevertheless 
 
 7. Derrick Bell illustrates this phenomenon when he describes Brown as a “symbol of the 
nation’s ability to condemn racial segregation and put the unhappy past behind us.” DERRICK 
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR 
RACIAL REFORM 130 (2004); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5 
(1971) (describing Brown as consisting of “mandates to eliminate racially separate public 
schools established and maintained by state action”); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 529 
(1963) (positing that Brown authorized the “complete elimination of racial barriers”). 
 8. VICTOR TURNER, FROM RITUAL TO THEATER 22 (1982). As Turner’s work suggests, a 
definitive anthropological account is not content with describing symbols as unmoored 
possibilities of meaning, but is instead attentive to the actual patterns of fashioned meaning, 
and thus the wax and wane of cultural and political influences. Id. 
 9. BELL, supra note 7, at 3. 
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remains mostly a symbol of despair and limitation in circles frequented by 
judges. More often than not, for these stewards of the law Brown signifies a 
fear of unleashing social strife, the assertion of jurisdictional boundaries, 
and the closing of the judicial mind. 
The portrait of Brown’s sacramentality is further complicated by its 
relationship to Marbury. Since they appeared together for the first time in 
the 1958 case of Cooper v. Aaron,10 the two decisions have been increasingly 
linked in the minds of judges as opposing symbols of judicial review. 
Whereas Marbury is held aloft to rally the faithful behind a banner of a 
vigilant and active judiciary, Brown is often hoisted in the very same case to 
signal judicial retreat and the protection of institutional prestige. This 
mostly unnoticed trend threatens to turn Brown into an anti-canonical ruling 
while securing Marbury’s dominance. 
But judges do not bear all of the blame, for litigation is not the only 
process that affects a legal icon’s vitality. How the decisions have been 
received by intellectual elites more generally reinforces their gestalt 
properties in juridic thought. Accordingly, Part V considers the influence of 
academic culture on these two sacred emblems. Treatment of this pair of 
cases mirrors the telling of religious creation stories and parables. I close by 
suggesting that a lasting devotion to our constitutional heritage must be 
made of more inspiring stuff than the combination of these two decisions. 
II. INTERPRETIVE FELLOWSHIP
In Constitutional Faith, Sanford Levinson called upon Americans to 
rediscover the roots of their “constitutional attachment[s].”11 Along the way, 
he illuminated a number of striking similarities between the obligations 
imposed by religious tradition and those demanded by American legal 
practices. The history of law, like that of religion, can be separated into 
more and less hierarchical interpretive traditions.12 Moreover, conceptions 
10. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
11. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 122–23 (1988).
12. Levinson finds the “catholic” position hierarchical with regard to who possesses the
ultimate authority to interpret the law, and one that combines text with custom in reading law. 
Id. at 29. By contrast, he argues that the “protestant” position is more communal as to 
interpretive authority and reveres text alone. Id. I find less persuasive Levinson’s claim that the 
protestant tradition of constitutional interpretation focuses exclusively on text while the 
catholic tradition holistically embraces unwritten sources of tradition. Id. I am not convinced 
that any interpretive tradition—religious or secular—consistently adheres to text alone. 
Moreover, by this standard, Jesus of Nazareth, whose ministry emphasized a host of non-textual 
sources of law such as parables, sayings, miracles, and good works should be categorized as a 
catholic, when in fact his emphasis on non-hierarchical forms of lawgiving (e.g., the prophetic, 
charismatic, and care-giving roles) inclines one to label him a protestant. At all events, we need 
not resolve the question of whether either camp can plausibly claim him. It is enough to stress 
how each interpretive tradition views the importance of mediating institutions. If we were to say 
instead that reformist interpretive traditions emphasize the individual’s moral capacity to 
engage in a relationship with the sacred realm without significant institutional mediation, this 
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of morality and readings of sacred text often stand in uneasy tension for 
both the citizen of the state and the religious adherent. According to 
Levinson’s account, a constitutional system worthy of the people’s devotion 
avoids idolatry and is leavened by a healthy dose of liberal respect for 
pluralism.13 
In the spirit of his humanistic study, I offer an account of Marbury and 
Brown informed by attention to sacred forms. The inquiry deepens 
Levinson’s insights by showing the myriad ways in which legal symbols and 
sayings are utilized to foster belief in the law. 
A. METHODOLOGY
At its essence, the project is an exercise in constitutional iconography. 
As I use the term, “constitutional iconography” has a twofold meaning. It 
refers first and foremost to a discipline: the study of the symbolic systems 
through which legal culture is constructed. The phrase has a second 
connotation: the actual set of symbols and expressive rituals in a particular 
area of law. 
Methodologically, this approach differs in some important respects 
from past intellectual traditions. Classical legal thought, either through 
arrogance or innocence, denied the permeability of the boundaries drawn 
and mediated by law. If social activity was not codified in identifiable rules or 
recognized by institutions, it lay beyond the law’s concern.14 Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, one of formalism’s greatest “theologians,” proselytized 
the “logical integrity of the system as system.”15 In this way, classical thinkers 
reified legal architecture. Study of the law and allegiance to the law, for all 
intents and purposes, were indistinguishable. 
Realism and its heirs, by contrast, committed a different sin: form was 
overlooked; boundaries collapsed. In the attempt to achieve a better match 
between the ideal of law and lived experience, they treated law as little more 
than the expression of pre-formulated policies or prejudices.16 Better to 
should suffice to distinguish the two strains of interpretive practice. 
13. Id. at 51–53.
14. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES 
ON AMERICAN LAW (DaCapo Press 1971) (1826–1830); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR 
ORDER, 1877–1920, at 81–93 (1967). 
15. This critical assessment came from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 14 AM. L.
REV. 233, 234 (1880). See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 
13–22 (1996). 
16. Morton Horwitz has argued that realism is best understood as a subspecies of
twentieth century progressivism and “a continuation of the reformist attack on orthodox legal 
thought.” MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 171 
(1992). Crisscrossing these legal intellectual movements are sharply divergent accounts of the 
legal subject, or humanity’s relationship with society. See Kathryn Abrams, The Legal Subject in 
Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 27, 32–74 (2001) (identifying three historical stages in law’s characterization 
of human beings). 
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consciously mold law to reflect the former, realists thought, than to allow law 
to be unconsciously disfigured by the latter. At its inception, realism 
energetically attacked concentrations of wealth and political power, but its 
reformist spirit soon inspired efforts to hone law into a vehicle to achieve 
private interests more efficiently. 
If their progenitors demanded unswerving allegiance to law’s most 
visible manifestations, realists ardently hoped that an appeal to pragmatism 
would rejuvenate belief in the law. Yet this presented a fresh dilemma: If law 
was truly just another site of in-fighting, mirroring only narrow needs and 
wants, it threatened to lose much of its faith-building power among the 
populace. The closer that law approached the post-classical ideal, the more 
one began to not only forget her neighbor’s concerns, but also undervalue 
commonalities. 
A constitutional iconographer treats law not as a system unto itself or as 
a displacement of the political sphere but as a series of overlapping 
domains.17 Faith is seen as an essential component of law—nurturing, 
shaping, and enlivening it—without obscuring how law actually operates. 
Two motives inform the iconographer’s project. The first is a desire to 
recover lost lines of descriptive inquiry from the grip of realism’s normative 
agenda without reproducing an autonomous vision of law.18 
A second thread, entwined with the first, endeavors to expand our 
comprehension of the myriad processes that impart legal meaning.19 These 
entail not only the formal procedure by which legal rules are crafted and 
refined, but the whole of legal myth-making, from the weaving of legal lore 
through popular sayings and vivid metaphors to the formation of cults of 
personality. 
If constitutional iconography embodies a distinctive scholarly outlook, it 
is the iconographer’s task to capture and catalogue the active symbols, rites, 
 
 17. For accounts of law that strive beyond the autonomous, see generally JOHN BRIGHAM, 
THE CULT OF THE COURT (1987); PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997); LEVINSON, supra note 11; ROBERT C. POST, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, 
PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL CHANGE (2004). 
 18. See KAHN, supra note 17, at 39–40; Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal 
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60–62, 69–70 (2003). Judges and 
advocates cannot be iconographers in the primary sense that I have discussed, for they do not 
come to the law with sufficient distance. They are, however, actively engaged in legal myth-
making in the secondary sense of the term, for jurists and lawyers themselves are the primary 
manipulators of law’s machinery and its archetypes. This is not to deny the role that academics 
and citizens play in the maintenance of legal culture, but to emphasize that the professional’s 
use of legal symbolism is authoritative and second-nature in ways that leave her a poor subject 
for self-analysis. 
 19. Recent portrayals include Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as CounterMonument: 
Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003); 
Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First Amendment 
Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261 (2004). 
TSAI_FINAL.DOC 5/2/2005  10:18 AM 
SACRED VISIONS OF LAW 1103 
frames of signification, and other expressive practices through which 
membership in interpretive fellowship is actualized.20 By interpretive fellowship, 
I refer to the communal dimensions of law: defining insiders and outsiders, 
facilitating understanding of authoritative pronouncements, and instilling a 
sense of identity, belonging, and mission. 
In drawing upon the study of sacred form to enlighten our 
understanding of constitutional form, I am not arguing that the content of 
legal rules should be guided by any particular set of religious precepts.21 
Rather, I do so to underscore the similarities between law and religion with a 
desire to gain an appreciation for the power of symbols—in law, as in 
religion—to legitimate governing institutions, instill shared values, and 
organize an interpretive community. If many of my examples come from the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, it is only because, like it or not, they form a 
significant part of the body of local knowledge we have inherited. 
I begin first with a word or two about the nature of legal faith; I then 
discuss just how belief in the rule of law is engendered by symbols. 
B. THE DYNAMICS OF FAITH
Without faith we are nothing; with it, law becomes possible. The essence 
of American communitas is neither unvarnished reason nor fear of violence, 
but an abiding belief in the rule of law. “The structure of the legal 
imagination,” Paul Kahn writes, “shares as much with religious belief as with 
logic.”22 Indeed, as Kahn argues, adjudication could not take place without a 
pre-existing culture of faith in the law.23 Within legal culture, faith and 
reason are not polar opposites, but mutually supporting phenomena—
working to enhance the durability of governing institutions. Faith provides 
context for and lends legitimacy to actions taken in law’s name. 
Conviction and hopefulness—as much as self-rule—are the hallmarks of 
citizenship in a constitutional democracy. Belief in law transcends death and 
time, binding a people across generations.  This realization, more than any 
other, helps to explain why citizens would heed prose from an unfamiliar 
age, setting down promises they had no role in formulating for themselves. 
The contractarian insists that we are all in privity with those who met in 
20. In other quarters, I have written about the ritualistic quality and historical
transformation of fire-inspired metaphors and legal sayings in free speech culture, Fire, Metaphor 
and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181 (2004), as well as juridic use of images of social 
discord to legitimate free speech doctrine, Speech and Strife, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 98–
100 (2004). 
21. This does not mean that they should dominate American law’s content in any way. Nor
does it deny that other indigenous religions address many of the same issues of communal 
relationships and self-identity. 
22. KAHN, supra note 17, at 37.
23. See id. at 184 (“Interpretation begins only after the sovereign withdraws. . . . The
silence of interpretation is filled by the presence of faith.”). 
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Philadelphia, bound by their obligations for good or naught.24 But the very 
language of contract ill suits the founding experience. Though both require 
mutuality of interest, contracts are formed among parties for well-defined 
purposes and identifiable periods of time, while covenants extend promises 
to descendants for perpetuity.25 As Daniel Elazar explains, covenants are 
witnessed by God, and frequently contain blessings or curses.26 Prominently 
displaying these covenantal features, the American Constitution reaches for 
perfection so as to secure the “blessings of liberty to ourselves and our 
posterity.”27 
The words’ ring of inspired purpose was no accident. Far from speaking 
in pure contractual terms, those who toiled in the vineyard of liberty drew 
upon the Biblical notion of blood-covenant, describing the “kindred blood 
which flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they 
have shed in defense of their sacred rights, [to] consecrate their union.”28 
Sworn enemies can enter into a pact with their enmity intact, but a covenant 
aims to fashion and sustain what James Madison called the “many cords of 
affection.”29 
Belief is not the same as acquiescence or fear of violence, two 
commonly proffered rationales for law’s hold on us. Robert Nozick is one of 
the leading theorists advocating a “minimal” night-watchman state based on 
the Lockean fear of one’s neighbors as potential aggressors.30 Yet he goes 
24. On America’s contractarian tradition, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 58–59 (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 282–91 (1998). 
25. In Genesis’s account of the giving of the covenant, Yahweh promises to Abram: “‘To
your descendants I give this country, from the River of Egypt to the Great River.’” Genesis 15:18–
19. Importantly, it is a promise that will be fulfilled over time, after generations of testing. Id. at
15:12–16. The covenant is re-consecrated during the age of Exodus once it becomes apparent
that greater legal specificity is necessary. Exodus 23:31–24:11.
26. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, COVENANT AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE GREAT FRONTIER AND
THE MATRIX OF FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 7, 29, 38 (1998) (arguing that America’s founding owes 
more to its covenantal tradition than to its Lockean roots); see also CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME 
OF THE REPUBLIC: THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 53 (1953). 
27. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (striving for “a more perfect union”).
28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 154 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra, at 9 (John Jay) (“Providence has been pleased to 
give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same 
ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same 
principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs . . . .”). 
29. In The Federalist No. 14, Madison appealed to the “people of America, knit together
as they are by so many cords of affection.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note 28, at 84 (James 
Madison). Cross-cutting my view of covenants and contracts is the approach staked out by 
Daniel Markovits, who acknowledges that “the conceptual core of contract remains the discrete 
and self-interested exchange” that “does not rely on affection,” but who nevertheless argues that 
contract law’s formality and thinness enhance its ability to create lasting communities of 
respect. Daniel Markovitz, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1450–51 (2004). 
30. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, at ix, 10–12 (1974). Nozick argues that
only state practices that legitimately address this collective fear of anarchy in Locke’s state of 
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wrong by overlooking the more robust conception of law envisioned by the 
framers. Resignation or apprehension rarely inspires enduring bonds—
more likely, such a basis for communal relationships breeds suspicion and 
distrust. 
There is in every faith tradition a profound dialectic between conviction 
and its testing.31 The stories of Abraham’s willingness to ritually slaughter his 
son Isaac to prove his loyalty and Job’s prolonged misery over a titanic wager 
between Yahweh and Satan attest to this tension between fidelity and ordeal. 
Similarly, the American legal tradition burgeons with narratives of belief in 
law forged in the crucible of constitutional conflict—think of the heroism of 
the revolutionary generation that asserted its independence from the British 
Crown, or the freedom riders who demonstrated their commitment to racial 
equality by subjecting themselves to invective, beatings, and firebombs. It is 
said that devotion that comes too easily may dissipate just as rapidly. 
As Lincoln’s rousing Gettysburg Address reminds us, law’s work is never 
done.32 To bind a people through a constitution is to take on an uneasy 
tension between fidelity to the past and receptivity to change. In law, as in 
religion, this tension can never be fully resolved, but must always be uneasily 
negotiated. 
Faith alone can fill the yawning gaps left by social compact and 
surmount the temporal problem of law. In Hebrews 11:1 it is written that 
“[o]nly faith can guarantee the blessings that we hope for, or prove the 
existence of realities that are unseen. It is for their faith that our ancestors 
are acknowledged.”33 The revolutionary leaders’ commitments are passed 
down to each successive generation, and their spirit moves us still, though it 
is for us to determine whether and how their promises are kept. Stressing 
the need for periodic renewal of the law, the Supreme Court has said that 
“[o]ur Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of 
Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. 
Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution’s written terms 
embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one.”34 
 
nature can be morally justified. Id. at 113–18. Any more robust conception of the state, Nozick 
insists, would violate individuals’ rights. Id. at 149. Note, however, that the founding generation 
insisted that remaking the constitutional order would not only bring more security, but also 
maximize happiness. See generally U.S. CONST. pmbl; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 
1776). 
 31. See, e.g., 1 Thessalonians 2:5 (“God . . . tests our hearts.”). 
 32. See Lincoln, supra note 2. 
 33. Hebrews 11:1–2. 
 34. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992). Playing a similar refrain, the 
Book of Hebrews recounts: 
It was by faith that Abraham obeyed the call to set out for a country that was the 
inheritance given to him and his descendants, and that he set out without knowing 
where he was going. . . . All these died in faith, before receiving any of the things 
that had been promised, but they saw them in the far distance and welcome them, 
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It follows that the opposite of faith is not atheism, but agnosticism. One 
who is agnostic to the project of law displays indifference to the industrious 
capacity of individuals to make public meaning of their lives. Dante Alighieri 
described such persons as “neither faithful nor unfaithful to their God, who 
undecided [stand] but for themselves.”35 If the adherent holds fast to the 
possibility of forming “a more perfect union,”36 the agnostic is wracked by 
thoughts that words mean nothing; that promises will go unfulfilled. Where 
this shadow darkens a people’s enterprise, there can be neither religion nor 
law. 
Although faith is trained on what tomorrow may bring, its ultimate ends 
need not be other-worldly—say, the belief in an afterlife or the existence of 
angels. Instead, the essence of conviction is keeping alive the possibility of 
one day being more true to foundational ideals, whatever their ultimate 
source. As the people have been overheard to play and sing, “freedom is in 
the trying.”37 Indeed, early Christianity’s emphasis on the “Kingdom of God” 
was not about securing a state of bliss after physical death. Rather, with eyes 
trained on the horizon, the kingdom served as an allegory for a social 
existence lived in this world, within harmonious relationships of mutual 
respect reinforced by law.38 
So, too, our constitutional attachments are rooted in real-world dreams 
for a freer and more egalitarian society. Everywhere the document is marked 
by ideals and compromises; worthy badges of success and jagged scars of 
failure.39 The slavery provisions are the starkest remnants of this country’s 
earliest pacts with human depravity,40 whereas the Reconstruction 
recognizing that they were only strangers and nomads on earth. People who use 
such terms about themselves make it quite plain that they are in search of a 
homeland. If they had meant the country they came from, they would have had the 
opportunity to return to it; but in fact they were longing for a better homeland, 
their heavenly homeland. 
Hebrews 11:8–16. 
35. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY: INFERNO, canto III, ls. 37–39, (Mark Musa
trans., Penguin Books 1984). Dante dooms these unfortunate shades, faithless in life, to wander 
the vestibule to Hell, forsaken by God and rejected by the Underworld. 
36. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
37. Wynton Marsalis, Freedom Is in the Trying, in BLOOD ON THE FIELDS (1997).
38. See, e.g., GERHARD LOHFINK, JESUS AND COMMUNITY: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF
CHRISTIAN FAITH 16–17 (1982). The centrality of religion’s concern for communal life is 
demonstrated in the periodic renewal of doctrine and intensive focus on the duties of 
adherents to one another. See id. at 87–122. 
39. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“[E]stablish[ing] justice . . . and secur[ing] the Blessings of
Liberty”); id. amends. I–X (Original Bill of Rights); id. amends. XIII–XV (Reconstruction 
Amendments); id. amend. XIX (guaranteeing sex equality in voting). 
40. See id. art. I, § 2 (Three-Fifths Clause); id. art. I, § 9 (preventing Congress from
banning migration and importation of slaves until 1808); id. art. IV, § 2 (Fugitive Slave Clause). 
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Amendments and the Nineteenth Amendment memorialize the 
consecration of new commitments to social equality.41 
Belief in law—not a pre-political calculation of self-interest42—has the 
capacity to unify a polity as scattered and diverse as our own. On this point, 
consider Felix Frankfurter’s dissenting statement in the great flag salute case 
that as a judge he considered himself “neither Jew nor Gentile, neither 
Catholic nor agnostic.”43 Although he was asserting a kind of neutrality in 
judging, he was also making a claim about the distinctive nature of the 
American Creed. He went on to say that “[w]e owe equal attachment to the 
Constitution and are equally bound . . . whether we derive our citizenship 
from the earliest or latest immigrants to these shores.”44 
Justice Frankfurter’s allusion to Paul’s Letter to the Galatians in the 
Barnette decision portrays our constitutional order as a boisterous 
community united by a common heritage founded on conviction and 
hopefulness.45 Call this the identity molding function of the rule of law. Just as 
Paul admonished that social differences should not confer privileged status 
 
 41. For a provocative theory that the Nineteenth Amendment guarantees more than 
women’s suffrage, but rather all of the indices of “equal citizenship,” see generally Reva B. 
Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 947 (2002). 
 42. There are those who contend that specific rights precede constitutional formation. See, 
e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 53–86 (2004) (advancing a rights-
based vision of constitutionalism based on natural law tradition). Others believe that certain 
pre-political principles guide the creation of governing institutions in any just society. See, e.g., 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971) (defending the principle of justice as fairness 
from the original position behind a “veil of ignorance”). 
 43. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (opposing the Court’s decision to enjoin compulsory flag salutes). Frankfurter’s 
dissent was especially bitter because the Barnette decision eviscerated his earlier decision in 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), upholding the Pledge of Allegiance 
against a challenge based on “freedom of conscience.” Id. at 597–98. We can agree with 
Frankfurter’s general account of our secular faith, even if we disagree that it was best served by 
allowing authorities to punish refusal to prostrate oneself to an object of faith. 
 44. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 647. 
 45. The full quote from the original source is that “[t]here can be neither Jew nor Greek, 
there can be neither slave nor freeman, there can be neither male nor female—for you are all 
one in Christ Jesus. And simply by being Christ’s, you are that progeny of Abraham, the heirs 
named in the promise.” Galatians 3:28–29. Note that continuity is achieved by linking the 
existing community to the earlier one constituted by Abraham. This theme is echoed in Paul’s 
First Letter to the Corinthians: 
For as with the human body which is a unity although it has many parts—all the 
parts of the body, though many, still making up one single body—so it is with 
Christ. We were baptised into one body in a single Spirit, Jews as well as Greeks, 
slaves as well as free men, and we were all given the same Spirit to drink. 
1 Corinthians 12:12–13. Paul’s reference to the fact that “not many of you are wise by human 
standards, not many influential, not many from noble families” suggests that a minority of the 
congregation was of a higher social status, and misused their position over the others. Id. at 
1:26–27. See generally LOHFINK, supra note 38, at 87–98. 
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in the congregants’ dealings with one another,46 so Frankfurter suggests that 
loyalty to our covenant of higher law takes precedence over race, religious 
background, or country of origin. This is so even if the people prefer a 
conception of citizenship that errs on the side of inclusiveness, and is 
accommodating of difference rather than totalizing. 
Paul himself faced a situation in Galatia where Jewish and non-Jewish 
members of the congregation found themselves split over the basis of 
community: some insisted that circumcision remained the price of entry 
whereas others urged—just as vocally—that baptism and adherence to the 
law were sufficient. In siding with the proponents of the more inclusive 
position, he reminded congregants of their mutual obligations based on 
respect and service. Speaking metaphorically of church members as parts of 
a physical body, Paul argued that social inequality should not be blindly 
reproduced within the relationships of the faithful.47 
Paul’s concern for “factions” and “troublemakers”48 within the body of 
the Church is echoed in Madison’s conviction that the disease of 
factionalism, rooted in man’s “reason and his self-love,” not be allowed to 
fester in the body politic.49 Although the American political tradition 
emphasizes institutional solutions far more than the Christian one, they 
share an image of the fallen man, appeal to virtue, and acknowledge the 
perpetual need for interpretation of shared commitments. Moreover, the 
ideal of equal respect manifests in the Constitution’s concern for the 
dignitary interests of the individual as well as in practices that encourage 
comity between sovereign institutions.50 
 
 46. Paul was not demanding that existing identities had to be forsaken. Nor was he 
encouraging a form of willful institutional blindness to social differences in the name of 
equality. The New Testament is replete with examples that higher social status and greater 
resources sometimes require the shouldering of different burdens. Asked by a rich man how he 
might enter the Kingdom of Heaven, Jesus supposedly said, “‘You need to do one thing more. 
Go and sell what you own and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; 
then come, follow me.’” Mark 10:21–22. Understanding the lesson but unable to share his goods 
in this way, the rich man sadly departs. Id. at 10:22; see also id. at 10:24–26 (“‘It is easier for a 
camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for someone rich to enter the kingdom of 
God.’”). Reinforcing this theme, Jesus reportedly encountered two people arguing over which 
was the greatest. He said to them: “‘If anyone wants to be first, he must make himself last of all 
and servant of all.’” Id. at 9:33–37. 
 47. His solution is repeated in Corinth over a related controversy involving the “strong 
and the weak”: the well-to-do members of the congregation and those who are materially worse 
off. See generally Gerd Theissen, The Strong and the Weak in Corinth: A Sociological Analysis of a 
Theological Quarrel, in THE SOCIAL SETTING OF PAULINE CHRISTIANITY: ESSAYS ON CORINTH 121, 
121–43 (John H. Schutz ed., 1982). 
 48. 1 Corinthians 1:10 (“Brothers, I urge you, . . . not to have factions among yourselves”). 
 49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 28, at 130 (James Madison). Madison did not 
believe factionalism could be defeated once and for all, but merely that its effects could be 
isolated and diffused through political arrangements. Id. 
 50. This reading of our founding document harmonizes the seemingly disparate concerns 
about the integrity of institutions—i.e., the three branches of the federal government, the state, 
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American law may be shepherded by prophets, judges, and would-be 
saviors, but it ultimately resides in the hearts and minds of ordinary 
believers, the true sovereigns.51 A dusting of faith resembles a pinch of 
mustard seed, “the smallest of all the seeds on earth. Yet once it is sown it 
grows into the biggest shrub of them all and puts out big branches so that 
the birds of the air can shelter in its shade.”52 If it is well tended, acceptance 
of law’s reign entwines itself with the political structures erected by 
humankind, fashions an enduring community, and helps to broaden its 
empire. 
C. WHEN CASES BECOME ICONS 
Every society lives and dies by its symbols. Faith is expressed, celebrated, 
and extended through them. A function of a particular culture and of the 
imagination, symbols can be regenerative of the human spirit, energizing 
people for collective action, or they can be deeply corrosive of existing 
relationships, discouraging collaboration. Any particular symbol can gain 
currency or fade over time; but when all of a community’s icons lose their 
poignancy, a culture itself may be said to have withered away. 
The very definition of the term captures its communal and 
amalgamative qualities: “[t]he word symbol is derived from two Greek words, 
syn, meaning together, and ballein, meaning to throw.”53 “Hence, symbolon, a 
sign, mark or token, impl[ies] the throwing together or joining of an 
abstract idea and a visible sign of it.”54 
Human beings and institutions carry on their daily tasks within fields 
delineated and constructed by symbols, although their boundaries cannot 
be seen or touched. As Joseph Campbell explains: 
The symbolic field is based on the experiences of people in a 
particular community, at that particular time and place. Myths are 
so intimately bound to the culture, time, and place that unless the 
 
the home—with equally protective language about individuals—e.g., expression, belief, political 
action, bodily integrity. 
 51. The Declaration of Independence claimed the natural born right of “one people to 
dissolve the political bands which have connected them to another”; declared that “all political 
connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved”; 
and seized the levers of self-government. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 30. 
Likewise, the Framers invoked the God-given sovereignty of the People in escaping the 
suffocating confines of the Articles of Confederation. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 52. Mark 4:30–32. This saying is multiply attested by the Gospel writers. See also Matthew 
13:31–32; Luke 13:18–19. 
 53. THOMAS ALBERT STAFFORD, CHRISTIAN SYMBOLISM IN THE EVANGELICAL CHURCHES 17 
(1942). 
 54. Id. 
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symbols, the metaphors, are kept alive by constant recreation 
through the arts, the life just slips away from them.55 
So it is in the legal domain. It is not enough to quietly whisper one’s 
allegiance to the law; the people’s adoration of law must be re-affirmed 
openly for all to behold. 
A rich body of doctrine recognizes and accommodates the power of 
symbols. Freedom of expression ensures that professions of faith are seen, 
unencumbered by governmental interference.56 The Establishment Clause 
stands for a closely related set of propositions: the state may infuse secular 
symbols with sacred force,57 and it may even make use of once sacred images 
that have lost their parochial meaning,58 but the state may not co-opt one 
religious tradition’s undiluted icons as its own.59 While law can never fully 
dictate the cultural meaning of a symbol but must take the symbol as it 
appears to others, law can ensure that man remains the master of his 
creations. 
More important, American law itself takes on a rainbow of symbolic 
forms. Although many signs are pictographic in nature, texts too have been 
 
 55. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE POWER OF MYTH 72 (1991); see also Clifford Geertz, Ethos, World 
View, and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols, reprinted in CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CULTURES 126, 127 (1973) (“Sacred symbols . . . relate an ontology and a cosmology to an 
aesthetics and a morality.”). 
 56. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995) (holding 
that a religious publication was entitled to equal opportunity for funding); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that students wearing anti-war 
armbands could not be punished by school officials). 
 57. It was Justice Robert Jackson who famously appreciated that: 
[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an 
emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a 
short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and 
ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, 
a color or design. The State announces rank, function, and authority through 
crowns and maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaks through the 
Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine, and clerical raiment. 
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
 58. Judge Richard Posner has offered the most elegant and accurate statement on how 
certain features of Christianity—such as Christmas trees and wreaths—have lost their strong 
sacred connotations among a critical mass of citizens. See, e.g., ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 
F.2d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1986). The notion that sacred items can lose their religious luster over 
time and become fair objects of regulation was first recognized by the Supreme Court in the 
Blue Laws controversy, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444–45 (1961). 
 59. Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41–42 (1980) (per curiam). To do so is not only to 
confuse the populace over questions of sovereignty and control, but to tarnish the sacred object 
itself. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962) (expressing the view that one of the 
Establishment Clause’s chief purposes is to forbid the state to “degrade religion” or engage in 
its “unhallowed perversion”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“‘The structure of 
our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from 
religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of 
the civil authority.’” (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 679, 730 (1872))). 
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known to acquire sacred status. Poetry—the artful arrangement of words to 
evoke deeper cultural beliefs—is the quintessential example of text that 
takes on this additional dimension.60 Paul Tillich of the Harvard Divinity 
School once explained that “[t]here are words in every language which are 
more than this, and in the moment in which they get connotations that go 
beyond something to which they point as signs, then they can become 
symbols.”61 
It is no different in the law. Under a perfect alchemy of circumstances 
even sub-propositional language compositions—such as case names, witty 
legal sayings, and colorful metaphors and metonyms—can acquire a magical 
quality in the hearts and minds of the people.62 
Legal precedents become symbols in a variety of ways. Litigation and 
direct action are the primary processes, but intellectual inquiry, too, plays an 
important part in generating law’s meaning.63 Some icons, like Marbury, 
acquire broader communicative significance gradually, finding favor initially 
among elites, and then among the population at large. Others, such as Roe v. 
Wade64 or Brown, arise against the backdrop of inflamed social passions—
they are born with intense, conflicting cultural associations that are only 
fueled to greater heights by subsequent developments. 
Some legal symbols are entirely judge-initiated (Marbury falls into this 
category). Others are driven mostly by citizen mobilization and coordinated 
litigation campaigns (the turning of Bowers v. Hardwick65 and Korematsu v. 
United States66 into anti-symbols in the canon are textbook instances of this 
phenomenon). But what every case-turned-icon shares is repeated usage—
even vigorous contestation—and ongoing cultural salience. The moment a 
ruling transforms into an active symbol, it becomes a visible representation 
of law. 
A case may be said to appear in symbolic form during constitutional 
litigation when one or more of the following conditions is met: (A) its actual 
holding is far afield from any of the relevant legal issues in the matter at 
hand; (B) there is little, if any, attempt by the lawgiver to compare the 
circumstances of the case with the present context; (C) the facts of a cited 
decision are obviously incomparable; (D) the case is cited for a legal 
 
 60. See CAMPBELL, supra note 55, at 73; PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 57 (1959). 
 61. TILLICH, supra note 60, at 55–56; see also E. WARWICK SLINN, VICTORIAN POETRY AS 
CULTURAL CRITIQUE: THE POLITICS OF PERFORMATIVE LANGUAGE 23 (2003) (describing poetry 
as a cultural event that “reconstitutes or reshapes . . . reality in the very act of reiterating its 
norms”). 
 62. “Falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater” is a phrase that continues to have salience 
in contemporary legal thought, as does the legal saying, “burning down the house to roast the 
pig.” See generally Tsai, Fire, Metaphor & Constitutional Myth-Making, supra note 20, at 218–26. 
 63. See infra Parts V.B & C. 
 64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 65. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 66. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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principle, but that principle is not seriously contested in the present dispute; 
(E) the case is recycled for an associated saying or quotation that transcends 
its original context; or (F) a decision from one doctrinal field is borrowed 
for another legal realm. 
Every case is a place-holder of sorts, for a medley of principles, 
prototypes, and entire modes of speaking. My definition of legal symbolism 
strives to capture the uses of a case beyond its function in classic analogic 
argumentation. Here, Tillich offers a useful starting point despite the fact 
that he inclines toward pre-existing universal truths and has a relatively fixed 
view of religious culture, believing that symbols cannot be created, but are 
merely discovered.67 Tillich identifies five characteristics of symbols: (1) a 
symbol expresses something non-literal, “transcend[ing] the empirical 
reality”; (2) a symbol actively participates in current reality through 
communicative engagement; (3) its meaning both depends upon and 
influences group assumptions; (4) it “open[s] up dimensions of reality”; and 
(5) a symbol possesses both “integrating and disintegrating power,” inspiring 
or discouraging belief.68 
Seen in this light, symbols serve a multiplicity of functions in 
maintaining law’s spiritual domain. Instead of serving as a basis for a 
comparison of like disputes, legal symbolism operates in more free-form 
ways: to mark the parameters of a cultural debate and set a general mood; to 
redirect observers’ attentions; to bolster a constitutional actor’s credibility; 
or to signal to key cultural constituencies or constitutional actors. 
Legal icons embolden lawgivers to stay an interpretive course or to 
blaze a new doctrinal path. Strategically deployed, objects of faith draw the 
law-abiding faithful together or divide them; facilitate adherence to a set of 
legal principles and political values or provide a mechanism for subverting 
them. 
Each in its own way, Marbury and Brown have accumulated these traits as 
“representative symbols”69 through the process of constitutional myth-
 
 67. Tillich claims that “[e]very symbol has a special function which is just it and cannot be 
replaced by more or less adequate symbols.” TILLICH, supra note 60, at 57–58. His slide here 
into a notion of fixed or irreplaceable symbols is difficult to square with what historians and 
anthropologists know to be true: some symbols lose their effectiveness as cultural literacy shifts 
and social pressures recede; in a new age, fresh symbols may be required to hold a community 
together. 
 68. Paul Tillich, The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols, in RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
AND TRUTH 3, 3–5 (Sidney Hook ed., 1961); see also Cyril C. Richardson, The Foundations of 
Christian Symbolism, in RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM 1, 3–5 (F. Ernest Johnson ed., 1955) (discussing 
centering and unifying characteristics of symbols). See generally GERTRUDE GRACE SILL, A 
HANDBOOK OF SYMBOLS IN CHRISTIAN ART, at xi (1975) (“[A] major purpose of Christian art was 
to instruct, to inspire and solidify Christian faith. From its inception this art was didactic. Its 
purpose was to teach Christian lessons to a largely illiterate public, through precise and literal 
visual images.”). 
 69. See TILLICH, supra note 60, at 55–57. Tillich distinguishes between two kinds of 
symbols: “representative” symbols, which appear in language, history, religion, and the arts, and 
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making. Their capacity to convey meaning in non-literal ways is easy enough 
to grasp. Both icons instantiate the intangible qualities of judicial power, 
reinforce preferred institutional configurations, and proclaim models of 
American citizenship. 
Not only do these cases demarcate the legal canon, they also serve as 
vehicles for the continuation of law itself. It would be a colossal mistake, 
however, to understand interpretive fellowship as a monolithic 
phenomenon. Symbols appear timeless, but in fact they reveal moments of 
socio-legal consensus. What is more, how the average citizen cherishes a 
case, if at all, differs from how a legal specialist appreciates its significance. 
Thinking more precisely about the phenomenon commonly called “legal 
culture,” then, is to see it as consisting of three belief-sustaining subcultures 
with overlapping points of contact: popular culture (the hurly-burly realm of 
the average citizen); academic culture (a comparatively more insulated 
environment organized by experts’ search for social truths); and professional 
culture (a domain geared toward the codification of law). 
Because we can never fully escape the institutions and leaders that act 
and speak on our behalf, it is only fitting that we explore their role in the 
development of legal iconography. One can uncover the spiritual life of a 
group by plotting the diachronic patterns of continuity and change in how 
these manifestations of authority occur. It is to the specific dialogic 
properties of Marbury and Brown in the judicial consciousness that I now 
turn. 
III. MARBURY AS A RELIC OF JUDICIAL EMINENCE 
A most fruitful path to understanding the nature of America’s 
community of legal faith is to trace the Supreme Court’s re-imagination of 
Marbury v. Madison over time. A good many scholars have critiqued the 
logical force of Chief Justice John Marshall’s reasoning in striking down the 
Judiciary Act provision that gave the Court original jurisdiction to issue writs 
of mandamus.70 Others have revisited the historical background of the 
decision,71 or, more broadly, explored its place in the discipline of federal 
 
“discursive” symbols, which appear in mathematics or logic. Id.; see also Tillich, supra note 68, at 
2–5. 
 70. See, e.g., Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall’s Selective Use of History in 
Marbury v. Madison, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 301 (contending that John Marshall “misused” 
governing precedent in his ruling); James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the 
Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (2001); William W. Van Alstyne, A 
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1. 
 71. See, e.g., SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990); 
Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of 
Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329; Larry D. Kramer, Marbury and the Retreat from 
Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 205 (2003); James M. O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 219 (1992). 
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jurisdiction.72 Surprisingly, there has been little in the way of sustained 
treatment of the decision’s continuing role in the subterranean aspects of 
constitutional faith-building.73 
Marbury has been cited over the years for several propositions: as the 
earliest, authoritative statement by the High Court endorsing judicial 
review;74 for the values of uniformity and superiority of federal law;75 and for 
the more banal point that questions of law are for courts to evaluate.76 Many 
of these references are standard fare, but a closer review reveals something 
more: over time, the case has become the key to unlocking the frame of 
understanding within which questions of institutional power are answered 
(or perhaps avoided). Marbury has become a sacramental link between 
present controversy and enduring constitutional mythology.77 
Observers of the Court have noticed that “Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist and his allies in those decisions have frequently quoted . . . the 
Marbury decision as justification for the court’s active role in policing the 
federal-state boundary.”78 But in truth its impact extends a good deal further 
than federalism controversies. Lately, the Justices have taken to invoking 
Marbury—often in the most controversial of cases—as a curious non-
sequitur.79 The Court unsheathes Marbury to stir the faithful whenever it 
believes, or desires observers to perceive, that the very project of law is at 
stake. 
 
 72. See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989). 
 73. L.H. LaRue describes Marbury as a “symbol,” but his analysis of the decision is devoted 
to the rhetorical moves made by Justice Marshall in the decision itself rather than to its current 
socio-linguistic significance. See L.H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN 
THE RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY 42–69 (1995). For a thoughtful exception to this trend, see 
Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The Emergence of a “Great Case,” 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003). 
 74. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 678 (1971). 
 75. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997); Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. 
Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 976 (1984). 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1997). 
 77. This might not always have been so. Marbury was not associated with the concept of 
judicial review until that prerogative became controversial in the late nineteenth century, 
Davison Douglas argues, becoming a great case only after leading men repeatedly invoked the 
ruling to defend the judicial sphere from legislative encroachment. Douglas, supra note 73, at 
386–87, 396–99. 
 78. Linda Greenhouse, 20-Year Extension of Existing Copyrights Is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2003, at A24; see also Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court and the Power to “Say 
What the Law Is,” 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839, 841–44 (2002). 
 79. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
242 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 n.7 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 352 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
616 (2000); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516; Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997); Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 566. 
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What’s more, liberals as well as conservatives have acquired a taste for its 
magic, reaching for the device across a stunning expanse of subjects. In the 
post-war era, Marbury’s influence has stretched from pure Article III cases80 
to such diverse matters as election law,81 intellectual property,82 speech 
subsidies and restrictions,83 interstate commerce,84 governmental 
immunities,85 Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,86 section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,87 and the non-retroactivity doctrine.88 
Notwithstanding the fact the Court exercises uncontroversial jurisdiction 
over routine matters, jurists of all stripes have found utility in replicating the 
themes of institutional crisis and judicial independence. 
A. SHOWCASING LEGAL MIGHT 
It would be tempting to conclude that invocation of Marbury represents 
a method of confronting the Court’s problematic status in democratic 
theory.89 But because the legitimacy of the Judicial Branch is no longer a 
serious problem in popular culture and because these displays of legal might 
have become so commonplace in the course of litigation,90 this development 
 
 80. Miller, 530 U.S. at 352; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378 (2000); Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995); Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 305 (1992); 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 794 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 
996, 1001 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 81. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 272 (2003); Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 n.7 (2000) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995). 
 82. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980). 
 83. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001); City of Chicago v. Morales, 
527 U.S. 41, 74 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 
569, 604 n.3 (1998). 
 84. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566. 
 85. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997) (presidential immunity); Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro Transit, 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity); 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (presidential privilege). 
 86. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1017 (1991) (White, J., dissenting); Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 n.40 (1988). 
 87. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 88. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); James 
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 89. Bickel’s comment that “judicial review was a . . . deviant institution in the American 
democracy” has nourished a more skeptical conception of judicial authority. ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (2d ed. 1986). 
 90. This is not to say that popular culture is of one mind on this. Political movements 
inspired by legal decisions—such as the anti-abortion movement, or the anti-gay marriage 
movement—frequently engage the public with cries of judicial overreaching. See, e.g., Editorial, 
New Fuel for the Culture Wars, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 2004, http://www.economist.com/ 
world/na/ displayStory.cfm?story_id=2460765 (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (stoking fear 
among Americans that “some activist judges and local officials” will redefine marriage for the 
entire nation); Joan Vennochi, Was Gay Marriage Kerry’s Undoing?, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2004, 
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should not be mistaken for an honest acknowledgement of the Judiciary’s 
design flaw. Rather, these strategically timed utterances are best understood 
as populist appeals to the people to engage their modern instinct to rally 
around the Court. In the course of such preemptive legal performances, 
lyrical sayings, parables, and other idioms complete the faith-building 
arsenal as much as doctrinal handicraft. 
Marbury is an effective talisman because it possesses enduring vitality. As 
Tillich explains: “[e]ven if individual creativity is the medium through which 
[a symbol] comes into existence (the individual artist, the individual 
prophet), it is the unconscious reaction of a group through which it 
becomes a symbol. No representative symbol is created and maintained 
without acceptance by a group.”91 
At this point, one might object that Marbury is part of a closed system of 
language and ethics accessible only to legal insiders. To the contrary, 
enlisting Marbury in the interpretive task is more of a direct appeal to the 
dominant beliefs of the people, who in recent years have increasingly 
adhered to a court-centered view of constitutionalism. Alex Bickel put his 
finger on this intimate connection between the ruling and our collective 
self-understanding when he wrote: “We know what the people imagine. They 
imagine that they rule themselves. And they imagine Marbury v. Madison.”92 
To be clear: my claim is not that the average citizen appreciates the 
intricacies of the original dispute in any real sense, but that he: (1) ardently 
subscribes to the ethos propagated by its modern formulation, and (2) 
recognizes, in general outline, what a constitutional actor is after when the 
decision’s sacral quality is invoked. 
The legal iconographer understands that displaying Marbury as a 
talisman harkens to an enduring American mythology. According to this 
heroic fable, courts are the exclusive arbiters of constitutional values and 
protectors of American freedoms. It is de rigueur for widely-read periodicals 
to celebrate judicial utterances as restorations of “the rule of law.”93 From 
 
at A15 (“A reference to dangers of activist judges was a frequent part of [President Bush’s] 
campaign stump speech”). At the same time, these same movements should not be seen as 
repudiations of juricentric culture; quite the contrary, movement leaders view legal strategy and 
political mobilization to go hand in hand. 
 91. Tillich, supra note 68, at 4. 
 92. BICKEL, supra note 89, at 92. Marbury constitutes, in Bickel’s estimation: 
even more than victor[y] won by arms, one of the foundation stones of the 
Republic. It is hallowed. It is revered. If it had a physical presence, like the Alamo 
or Gettysburg, it would be a tourist attraction; and the truth is that it very nearly 
does have and very nearly is. 
Id. at 74. 
 93. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Court Cases Checked a President’s Powers, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 
2004, at A16 (describing “enemy combatant” cases as a “declaration that the rule of law is above 
the Commander-in-Chief”); see also David Ignatius, Editorial, The Balance of Justice Amid a War, 
WASH. POST, July 2, 2004, at A15 (“America’s commitment to the rule of law was reaffirmed [in 
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time to time popular writings explicitly equate Marbury with stability and 
accountability in the law.94 But it is only in the post-World War II era that the 
saying has materialized in abundance, and is only after the rise of the 
Supreme Court to a prominent position in American life that Marbury has 
become associated with an insistent style of judicial discourse.95 To many 
believers, obedience to the law and faith in the courts are one and the same. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, time and distance improve an artifact’s 
potency. Marbury’s melody sounds pleasing to the ear because it replays one 
of the earliest expositions on judicial prerogative, rendered in a bygone era. 
As time has passed, the decision has become less important for the actual 
controversy presented. Emptied of its historical freight, it has been reborn as 
a capacious vessel into which we pour our social and political angst and 
collective self-understandings. 
When the Supreme Court—or any court, for that matter—reaches back 
to this precedent, one instinctively understands that the Court is signaling its 
sense that core institutional values are imperiled; reasserting an ancient 
prerogative; and calling upon adherents to demonstrate the depths of their 
constitutional faith by supporting the interpretive course charted by the 
institution. John Leubsdorf has described judicial resort to citations in this 
manner as using a “hypertext” that “summons up a myth or previous work 
with a word or two.”96 When this simple act conjures all of the dramatic 
rhythms and historical pedigree of the federal judiciary, other constitutional 
actors are expected to prostrate themselves before the sacred object’s 
brilliance. 
As with any sign of faith, Marbury elicits sentiments that are impossible 
to convey through words alone. Whichever substantive body of law the Court 
has elected to embrace, whatever the facts presented in a given case, 
activation of Marbury envelopes an interpretive move with authenticity and 
historicity, as much as principled purpose. 
This was precisely the effect in the intriguing case of Thompson v. 
Oklahoma,97 in which the Court established a bright-line constitutional rule 
against the execution of persons who were younger than sixteen at the time 
of the offense.98 Then, as now, symbol and rule interacted in mutually 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld].”); Editorial, Reaffirming the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A26 
(same). 
94. See, e.g., Editorial, The Email Note; It’s Making the Rounds, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb.
29, 2004, at 82 (“[T]he rule of law and judicial review . . . are essential to free government. Can 
you say Marbury v. Madison?”); Ann Woolner, Vote on Funding Betrays Founders’ Vision, L.A. BUS. J., 
Aug. 11, 2003, at 55 (lauding Marbury for “Establishing the Law”). 
95. The phrase most lawyers and laypersons associate with Marbury was not even repeated
by the Court until 1958, in the case of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (per curiam). See infra 
Part III.C. 
96. John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 478 (2001).
97. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
98. Id. at 838.
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reinforcing ways. The surface analysis, hewing closely to well-established 
doctrinal conventions, proceeded thus: the Eighth Amendment embodies 
“evolving standards of decency,” most states that employ a minimum age for 
death eligibility set it at sixteen, juries are disinclined to mete out death to 
anyone younger, and the international community opposes execution of 
juveniles. 
Simultaneously, the Justices’ surprising invocation of Marbury was 
addressed to the anticipated problem of social perception: namely, the 
Court’s potential exposure to external criticism given the open-ended 
nature of the Eighth Amendment and the undeniable consequence that the 
ruling would compel the reconfiguration of many state practices (i.e., 
nineteen states had set no age limits for death eligibility).99 As John Paul 
Stevens dramatically announced, “That the task of interpreting the great, 
sweeping clauses of the Constitution ultimately falls to us has been for some 
time an accepted principle of American jurisprudence. See Marbury v. 
Madison.”100 
At first blush, the citation to Marbury seems entirely out of place, for 
there was no direct challenge to their interpretive prerogative (certainly no 
more so than in the usual constitutional case), but any confusion dissipates 
as soon as one appreciates the importance of legal iconography. By holding 
out the sacred object, the Court sought to preempt criticism of its place to 
discern the point at which the contemporary values of the community have 
evolved from tolerance of state practice to a prohibitory norm.101 
Legal precepts, like religious ones, can aspire to the universal or the 
parochial. In this case, the Court drew upon Marbury’s legacy to stake out a 
more inclusive and compassionate vision of law, marked by a higher degree 
of congruence between American law and international norms than we have 
been accustomed to witnessing.102 
99. Id. at 826.
100. Id. at 833 n.40.
101. In denying the interpretive difficulties in the Eighth Amendment context, the Court
said that “the method [of analysis] is no different.” Id. This area of constitutional criminal 
procedure is, in a word, a mess. In some cases, the Court has resorted to a mechanical tallying 
up of the number of states that employ the challenged practice. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 
U.S. 137, 154 (1987); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 294–95 (1976). But this seems, 
at best, a recipe for ensuring total congruence between present practice and the scope of the 
Eighth Amendment, leaving the Amendment to mean nothing more than what the majority of 
states currently say it means. The theories of the “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Clause 
variously trotted out by jurists are not consistently invoked, whether the goal is to spur the 
abolition of outdated punishments, preserve bodily integrity, cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942), deter “mindless vengeance,” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986), or 
avoid an appreciable risk of unnecessary suffering, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884–85 
(1983). 
102. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316–37 n.21 (2002) (noting that “within the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally 
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 
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Moreover, the ruling dispensed the saving power of the courts to rescue 
children from those who would treat them as fully-formed adults and 
extinguish their very existence. In a transcendent moment like this, legal 
iconography facilitates the formation of a “reconciled community” of the 
powerful and the weak. Rule and symbol join to paint what Gerhard Lohfink 
calls a “contrast-society” that stands in tension with the dominant social 
world and offers counter-ideals to which law should aspire.103 Cooper v. Aaron 
is the leading example of this, when Marbury was pressed into the service of 
black children brave enough to demand an end to segregated schools in the 
face of recalcitrant public officials.104 
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,105 the Court recapitulated the theme 
of judicial heroism by acting as the champion of the poverty-stricken. The 
congressional enactment at issue barred legal services attorneys who 
received federal funding from attacking “existing law.”106 On this occasion, 
the Court declared that it was guarding against the prospect of two-tiers of 
justice, in which some welfare recipients’ rights are less valued because their 
lawyers are prevented by federal law from raising arguments challenging the 
political status quo.107 Drawing up Marbury as a shield for the wretched, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s ruling castigated Congress for impeding the 
work of legal services lawyers whose indigent clients will often have “no 
alternative source . . . to receive vital information respecting constitutional 
and statutory rights bearing upon claimed benefits.”108 Justice Kennedy, like 
Justice Stevens, operates within a cultural field demarcated by Marbury’s 
domain. Each has proved himself to be practiced in the art of constitutional 
myth-making to advance his conception of law. 
These days, controversies like Velazquez, in which Marbury is turned loose 
on behalf of egalitarian impulses, are relatively scarce. Nor are these 
dramatic shows of institutional might confined to putting down instances of 
outright defiance à la Cooper v. Aaron. Instead, luxuriant stagings of judicial 
prowess routinely appear in situations where the Judiciary faces no serious 
challenge to its jurisdiction and no real danger of political retribution. 
Consequently, they appear to be motivated by preventative objectives: 
(2003) (referring to the “values we share with a wider civilization” in striking down an anti-
sodomy law), with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (rejecting the argument 
that “sentencing practices of other countries are relevant” to Eighth Amendment analysis). 
103. LOHFINK, supra note 38, at 122.
104. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). For an extended discussion of Marbury’s appearance in Cooper, see
Part IV.C. 
105. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
106. Id. at 538.
107. Id. at 546.
108. Id. at 546. The Court decided the case on both First Amendment and Article III
grounds. By prohibiting legal services lawyers from advancing “vital theories and ideas,” 
Congress had encroached upon the Judiciary’s “sphere of . . . authority to resolve a case or 
controversy.” Id. at 545, 548 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803)). 
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avoiding the erosion of public trust in the Judiciary so carefully nurtured 
over the decades. Indeed, the notion that courts are the very best vehicles 
for securing freedom today borders on fundamentalism. 
B. CATECHISMS OF JUDICIAL CENTRALITY
Because the average citizen is unfamiliar with the details of the case or 
the fine points of jurisdiction, references to Marbury will often be 
accompanied by a forceful reminder that “[i]t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”109 It is this phrase 
that evidences the most visible connection between the Supreme Court’s 
agenda and popular understandings of law. Recitation of Marshall’s famous 
words fulfills a special function: as the secular equivalent of religious 
catechism. 
Catechesis has been described as “an education in the faith of children, 
young people and adults which includes especially the teaching of Christian 
doctrine imparted, generally speaking, in an organic and systematic way, 
with a view to initiating the hearers into the fullness of Christian life.”110 
Legal doctrine is imparted in analogous fashion, through the teaching of 
core traditions and modes of life; the unification of mind, body, and mystery 
through the staging of legal performatives; and finally, the dissemination of 
conceptions of law as truth (or at least the closest human versions of truth). 
The ceremonial recitation of liturgical sayings simultaneously fulfills 
three functions: (1) existential induction; (2) institutional creation; and (3) 
presentification.111 First, repetition of Marbury-inspired language allows 
believers to participate in the community and confirms their place within 
the legal order. Second, the interplay animates guiding precepts, 
“enabl[ing] the act of faith to have a concrete content.”112 It operates to 
reenact and thus to reaffirm the rule of law.113 Third, the performance 
allows law to be internalized and reproduced by the listeners themselves. 
While the “duty to say what the law is” formula reminds and instructs 
the laity, it does so at the risk of inspiring unthinking obedience rather than 
heartfelt devotion. This danger runs in both directions—just as the believer 
is encouraged to assent, so too elites who resort to such linguistic cues are 
109. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
110. The constituent elements of catechisis are “the initial proclamation of the Gospel or
missionary preaching through the kerygma to arouse faith, apologetics or examination of the 
reasons for belief, experience of Christian living, celebration of the sacraments, integration into 
the ecclesial community, and apostolic and missionary witness.” POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC 
EXHORTATION CATECHESI TRADENDAE 26 (1979). 
111. JEAN LADRIERE, THE PERFORMATIVITY OF LITURGICAL LANGUAGE 60–61 (1973).
112. PAUL TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 24 (1957).
113. As Paul Kahn explains, Marbury constructs a conception of law that is enduring, set
apart from politics, legitimated by popular sovereignty, and expressed in coercive interventions. 
See KAHN, supra note 17, at 19–34. 
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emboldened to rely on heavy-handed mantras to demand rote responses. 
Symbolic communication may be unavoidable, but one would not want law 
reduced to nothing more than a series of short-cuts, grunts, and half-
whispers. 
Because of their resonance, one must always be watchful of the causes 
in which constitutional mantras are enlisted. Lately, Marbury’s radiance has 
been extended for the purpose of advancing a juricentric conception of the 
constitutional order. That is to say, the people’s own faith in the courts has 
been evoked to cajole, berate, and beat back the very institutions most 
responsive to the people’s concerns. 
A good deal of ink has been spilled over the dangers of an imperial 
judiciary.114 Nevertheless, as recently as 1995, in Miller v. Johnson,115 the Court 
cited the holy trinity of judicial prerogative in a single breath: Marbury, Baker 
v. Carr, and Cooper v. Aaron.116 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, struck 
down a set of oddly shaped majority black legislative districts in the State of 
Georgia.117 The redistricting plan at issue bore the imprimatur of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, secured through the pre-clearance process under 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.118 
Refusing to defer to the Justice Department’s expertise, the Court 
expounded: 
Were we to accept the Justice Department’s objection itself as a 
compelling interest adequate to insulate racial districting from 
constitutional review, we would be surrendering to the Executive 
Branch our role in enforcing the constitutional limits on race-
based official action. We may not do so. See, e.g., United States v. 
Nixon (judicial power cannot be shared with Executive Branch); 
Marbury v. Madison (“It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is”); cf. Baker v. Carr 
(Supreme Court is “ultimate interpreter of the Constitution”); 
Cooper v. Aaron (“permanent and indispensable feature of our 
constitutional system” is that “the federal judiciary is supreme in 
the exposition of the law of the Constitution”).119 
This Marbury-driven flourish is astonishing, revealing not merely the 
boldness with which the modern Court routinely portrays its own authority, 
 
 114. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 89, at 17; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY 
FROM THE COURTS 6–14 (1999); Robert C. Post & Reva Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and 
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 
2026–39 (2003). 
 115. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 116. Id. at 922 (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)). 
 117. Miller, 515 U.S. at 924–25, 928. 
 118. Id. at 925–27. 
 119. Id. at 922 (citations omitted). 
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but also its sense that legitimacy is more closely aligned with popular 
sentiment than professional attitudes. To put it another way, the 
reproduction of legitimacy anxiety has become just another part of a jurist’s 
spiritual weaponry.120 
What L.H. LaRue memorably described as a story of jurisdictional 
constraints in its original telling has metamorphosed into an emblem that 
primarily signifies limits on other constitutional actors.121 The principle of 
judicial self-limitation has become a symbol of self-empowerment. When it is 
unveiled in the course of an opinion, Marbury can bolster the stature of the 
Judiciary in the eyes of the faithful (an integrative effect) or undercut the 
authority of another entity (a disintegrating effect). 
In City of Boerne v. Flores,122 the Justices reached for Marbury no less than 
four times in a show of rhetorical force. They did so in order to diminish the 
scope of Congress’s authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).123 
Passed in response to Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith,124 its purpose was 
to provide statutory protection against incursions on religious liberty by laws 
of general applicability.125 
Denying Congress this power, Justice Kennedy’s opinion declared that 
the very notion of judicial review “is based on the premise that the ‘powers 
of the legislature are defined and limited . . . .’”126 The Court’s opinion 
closed by insisting that: 
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted 
within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the 
duty to say what the law is. When the political branches of the 
Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation 
of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in 
later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with 
the respect due them under settled principles.127 
Tacked to the end of this pair of key explanatory sentences, Marbury 
accomplished two objectives at once: it limited the sphere of another branch 
120. Cardozo described a judge’s tools as part of a “legal armory . . . capable of furnishing a
weapon for the fight and of hewing a path to justice.” BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 45 (1921). 
121. See LARUE, supra note 73, at 65.
122. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
123. Id. at 516–18.
124. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Court rejected a free exercise challenge to a state
regulation of general applicability invoked against a state employee’s sacramental use of peyote. 
See id. at 888–90. 
125. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512, 515–16.
126. Id. at 516 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)). Justice
Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Scalia (in part). 
127. Id. at 536 (citation omitted).
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of government and interposed the prestige of the Court in the midst of a 
contest over law’s authorship. Where are the virtues of humility, patience, 
and foresight that characterized older models of lawgiving? Lost is the 
interpretive aim on the part of leaders in their dealings with the flock to 
“build them up and not to break them down.”128 
What is more, it was no cooperative faith tradition to which the High 
Court demanded other constitutional actors pay fealty, but a sharply vertical 
vision of law. There was little cause to take umbrage but for the fact that 
Congress’s action contradicted the Court’s self-understanding as the 
exclusive wellspring of our constitutional norms.129 In support of a court-
centered conception of the constitutional process, the Justices not only 
invoked the “separation of powers” doctrine, they also raised the specter of 
Congress as rights-destroyer by warning darkly of “shifting legislative 
majorities” amending the Constitution outside of Article V.130 
It is doubtful that the heavens would have fallen if the Judiciary 
undertook a more collaborative reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 
In all events, this ostentatious Marbury-laden soliloquy betrayed the 
institution’s own aggressive posture.132 If the judicial power holds out the 
promise of salvation, then the Court often acts like an Old Testament God 
jealous of his prerogatives. 
Marbury’s reappearance served another purpose: it reassured the 
citizenry that courts have believers’ best interests at heart. The Justices 
pointedly minimized the threat of religious discrimination by state actors,133 
thereby underscoring the overpowering sense that the Judiciary, not the 
political branches, can best be trusted to calibrate the law to protect 
citizens.134 Thus unfolded an epic battle over which institution is 
 
 128. Jeremiah 24:6–7; see also 1 Thessalonians 5:11. 
 129. Accord Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) (“The ultimate 
interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning 
remains the province of the Judicial Branch.”). 
 130. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529. 
 131. RFRA did not so much impair the Court’s capacity to decide questions in the usual 
Article III sense as it denied the Judiciary the last word on how best to protect religious liberty. 
The Court could have treated its own interpretations as setting a baseline for equal protection 
rights rather than a ceiling beyond which the political branches could not venture. See generally 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on 
Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003). 
 132. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537. 
 133. Id. at 531 (noting how the hearings on “laws of general applicability which place 
incidental burdens on religion” produced much discussion that “centered upon anecdotal 
evidence”). 
 134. The Boerne Court’s rhetoric foreshadowed its dismissive attitude towards the problem 
of official age discrimination a few short years later. In Kimel, the Court dismissed Congress’s 
1974 extension of the ADEA to the States as “an unwarranted response to a perhaps 
inconsequential problem.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89. 
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authentically called to give voice to the law, played out in constitutional rules 
and reinforced through legal catechisms. 
This certainly was not the first time this scene of Marbury worship has 
played out in the legal domain; nor is it likely to be the last. Still, for those 
skeptical of the dominant model of judicial authority, a saying from Paul (a 
fellow interpreter of law) to the faithful gathered at Corinth seems apt: 
“[T]hough I have all the faith necessary to move mountains—if I am without 
love, I am nothing.”135 Alexander Hamilton struck a similar theme in The 
Federalist No. 1: “For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at 
making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured 
by persecution.”136 
For the modern jurist, the lesson is that the esteem to which other 
constitutional actors are held impacts the efficacy of legal utterances and the 
quality of communal relationships. If the bonds of respect are eroded, law 
loses its poetic vitality, becoming little more than a blunt instrument that 
leaves dark hues of resentment in its wake. 
C. THE MYTH OF THE RELUCTANT LAWGIVER 
One of Marbury’s enduring legacies is a set of highly stylized 
performative utterances that conjure what I call the myth of the reluctant 
lawgiver, a deeply-embedded archetype. This judicial visage leaps to life from 
the original decision’s language of solemn duty, even if Marbury itself is not 
always explicitly mentioned. Yet when a constitutional actor exhibits 
reluctance to wield power, one can be reasonably sure that he will ultimately 
exercise that prerogative. 
Emphasizing responsibility over institutional province, the lawgiver 
takes up his role with palpable reticence. In propounding law, he claims to 
feel “compelled” or “constrained” to exercise authority “imposed” upon 
him.137 There is a piquant populist flavor to this appeal: one can almost 
picture a jurist lobbying the American people to show compassion for those 
who are called to interpret the Constitution. 
One of the oldest instances of this style of symbolic discourse occurred 
during the controversy over the Second National Bank. The momentous 
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland upholding the legislation that established 
 
 135. 1 Corinthians 13:2–3. 
 136. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 28, at 5 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 137. The Supreme Court noted: 
The Constitution has imposed upon this Court final authority to determine the 
meaning and application of those words of that instrument which require 
interpretation to resolve judicial issues. With that responsibility, we are compelled 
to examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under 
which they were made . . . . 
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 
n.10 (1983) (quoting Pennekamp). 
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the Bank may have vindicated Hamilton’s Federalist vision for monetary 
policy, but the language was vintage Marshall: timeless, declarative, 
expansive.138 Evincing an acute awareness of the contentious nature of the 
dispute, the opinion added a gloss of reticence on Marbury’s duty-bound 
rhetoric, nearly weeping over the “awful responsibility” bestowed upon the 
Court by the Constitution to interpret its guarantees.139 By underscoring the 
weightiness of his load and appearing to resist a full-throated exercise of 
power, Marshall sought to cultivate trust and social acceptance of the 
Court’s judgment. Public-mindedness appears to be the orator’s motivation 
rather than a desire for personal aggrandizement. 
In the seminal decision of Trop v. Dulles,140 which held denaturalization 
of an unwanted war deserter to be cruel and unusual punishment, the 
Justices characterized the interpretive role as “inescapably” theirs.141 
Similarly, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court spiced its analysis of death 
penalty jurisprudence with this hint of regret over its sacred trust: “the task 
of interpreting . . . the Constitution ultimately falls to us . . . .”142 The signal 
is as loud as it is clear: No one else is charged with this hallowed task; no one 
else in her right mind would seek it out. 
More recently, we saw this dramatis personae unveiled in Bush v. Gore,143 
the presidential election case that catapulted George W. Bush into the White 
House. The per curiam decision overturning the Florida Supreme Court’s 
recount order memorably recapitulated the rhetoric of reticence: 
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority 
than are the Members of this Court, and none stand more in 
admiration of the Constitution’s design to leave the selection of the 
138. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (emphasis added); see also
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 384 (1957) (saying that the Court is “constrained to reverse” 
obscenity conviction on free speech grounds). 
139. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added). According to Marshall:
No tribunal can approach such a question without a deep sense of its importance,
and of the awful responsibility involved in its decision. But it must be decided
peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps, of hostility of a still
more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this tribunal alone can the
decision be made. On the supreme court of the United States has the constitution
of our country devolved this important duty.
Id. at 400–01. 
140. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Here, too, Earl Warren’s opinion for the Court rang with the
sensation of passive, even regretful, judgment: “That issue confronts us, and the task of 
resolving it is inescapably ours. . . . . When it appears that an Act of Congress conflicts with one 
of these provisions, we have no choice but to enforce the paramount commands of the 
Constitution. We are sworn to do no less.” Id. at 103–04. 
141. Id. at 103.
142. 487 U.S. 815, 833 n.40 (1988) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)). 
143. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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President to the people, through their legislatures, and to the 
political sphere. When contending parties invoke the process of 
the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to 
resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has 
been forced to confront.144 
This clever move recalled Marbury’s characterization of judicial review as an 
essential part of our system of government,145 though it also obscured the 
reality that the Court twice exercised its discretionary review process to 
intervene in the electoral process. 
Staged hesitance is an effective technique for a faceless institution at 
once to personify justice and to maintain a studied detachment. In assuming 
this mystical identity, the Justices convey the impression that their 
prerogative is being exercised out of sheer “necessity,” and that an 
alternative outcome would amount to abject “surrender.”146 Interpretation is 
cast as a divine calling. Though others might shirk their responsibility to 
constitutional ideals, this performance suggests, the Judiciary cannot forsake 
its destiny. Other tell-tale signs of this type of myth-making include language 
inviting accolades for tough-mindedness in rendering an unpopular 
decision147 or suggesting that others’ actions led to the interpretive outcome 
in a given dispute.148 
The reluctant hero figure draws upon a number of literary and folkloric 
analogues: the Once and Future King who is chosen by Providence and 
makes a triumphal return,149 or the Judeo-Christian God who periodically 
sends prophets, judges, and kings to aid his flock, but only after they have 
lost their way.150 
The gulf between humility in service and disempowerment through self-
aggrandizement is illustrated by the different places of honor accorded the 
iconic figures of Moses and Saul. Moses, chosen by Yahweh to lead the newly 
unshackled flock to the Promised Land, is beset by doubts that the people 
will believe him or heed his words. “‘Please, my Lord, I have never been 
eloquent,’” Moses protests upon learning of his mission, “‘for I am slow and 
144. Id. at 111.
145. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
146. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (stating that deferring to the
Department of Justice’s view that race-based districting complies with the Voting Rights Act 
“would be surrendering to the Executive Branch our role in enforcing the constitutional limits 
on race-based official action.” (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177)); see also Marbury, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (describing the exercise of judicial review as a “necessity” under our 
form of limited government). 
147. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 538 U.S. 98, 111 (2000); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 865–66 (1992). 
148. See, e.g., Bush, 538 U.S. at 111.
149. See generally SIR THOMAS MALORY, LE MORTE D’ARTHUR (Stephen H.A. Shepherd ed.,
2004); T.H. WHITE, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING (1939). 
150. See, e.g., Exodus 3:1–15; Judges 6:7–10; 1 Samuel 1:19–28.
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hesitant of speech.’”151 God’s anger momentarily kindled at these remarks, 
but this merely redoubled his faith in his chosen: Moses was given a staff by 
which to work miracles to convince the faithful, and he gained the assistance 
of Aaron, whose gift of speech would serve Moses’ cause.152 There, too, 
ancient myth and symbols of authority were creatively united to reawaken 
belief in the law. 
By contrast, Saul, Israel’s second king, is abandoned for choosing to 
carry out Yahweh’s commands in such a way as to accommodate his personal 
desire for popularity. Ordered to crush Israel’s opponents and lay everything 
under a curse of destruction, Saul’s army instead “spared . . . the best of the 
sheep and cattle the fatlings and lambs and all that was good.”153 
Another striking incarnation of the reluctant lawgiver is revealed in 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, in which the would-be ruler thrice refuses the 
crown. As Brutus foreshadows in Scene I upon witnessing the excited crowds 
trailing Caesar’s procession in the public square: “What means this 
shouting? I do fear the people/Choose Caesar for their king.”154 
Midway through Scene II of Act I, Brutus pulls aside Casca to inquire 
about Caesar’s interactions with the common people that day: 
Casca: Why, there was a crown offered him; and, being offered 
him, he put it by with the back of his hand, thus; and 
then the people fell a-shouting. 
Brutus: What was the second noise for? 
Casca: Why, for that too. 
Brutus: Was the crown offered him thrice? 
Casca: Ay, marry, was’t, and he put it by thrice, everytime 
gentler than other; and at every putting-by mine honest 
neighbours shouted. 
Cassius: Who offered him the crown? 
Casca: Why, Antony. 
Brutus: Tell us the manner of it, gentle Casca. 
Casca: I can as well be hanged as tell the manner of it: it was 
mere foolery; I did not mark it. I saw Mark Antony offer 
151. Exodus 4:10–11.
152. Id. at 4:10–17.
153. 1 Samuel 15:9. Although Samuel’s intent was to sacrifice this bounty to Yahweh, his
actions countermanded Yahweh’s direct command and interposed his personal desire for 
worship and respect by others. Id. 
154. THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 950 (W.J. Craig ed., 1919).
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him a crown; yet ‘twas not a crown neither, ‘twas one of 
these coronets; and, as I told you, he put it by once; but, 
for all that, to my thinking, he would fain have had it. 
Then he offered it to him again; then he put it by again; 
but, to my thinking, he was very loath to lay his fingers off 
it. And then he offered it the third time; he put it the 
third time by; and still as he refused it the rabblement 
shouted and clapped their chopped hands, and threw up 
their sweaty night-caps, and uttered such a deal of 
stinking breath because Caesar refused the crown, that it 
had almost choked Caesar; for he swounded and fell 
down at it: and for mine own part, I durst not laugh, for 
fear of opening my lips and receiving the bad air. 
Cassius: But soft, I pray you: what! did Caesar swound? 
Casca: He fell down in the market-place, and foamed at mouth, 
and was speechless. 
Brutus: ‘Tis very like: he hath the falling-sickness. 
Cassius: No, Caesar hath it not; but you, and I,/And honest 
Casca, we have the falling-sickness. 
Casca: I know not what you mean by that; but I am sure Caesar 
fell down. If the tag-rag people did not clap him and hiss 
him, according as he pleased and displeased them, as 
they use to do the players in the theatre, I am no true 
man.155 
Not only is the scene recounted by Casca deliberately staged by Caesar, 
its heightened artificiality serves a dual purpose. The simulated quality of 
Caesar’s crowning is exemplified by the informal nature of the setting (the 
local market), the fake crown offered by Antony, and Caesar’s own 
exaggerated reactions; all of it allows him to reach for the fruits of his 
ambition while allowing him to deny his intentions. Indeed, “when he 
[Caesar] came to himself again, he said, if he had done or said any thing 
amiss, he desired their worships to think it was his infirmity.”156 
But there is another layer of performance. Through the marketplace 
incident’s re-staging by Casca and his fellow conspirators, the audience 
understands Caesar’s performance to be merely a warm-up act in his play for 
power. Each time Caesar refuses the makeshift crown, the crowd gets 
progressively more agitated; in the minds of his detractors, Caesar’s 
 
 155. Id. at 951–52. 
 156. Id. at 952 (recounted by Casca). 
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reputation and influence grows with each disavowal of sovereign authority. 
As the conspirators rightly perceive these ominous developments, one’s 
outward pretension to power is inversely related to the willingness of others 
to cede it. Openly coveting authority will raise another’s hackles; denying 
one’s ambition, by contrast, usually softens resistance. 
So it is in the realm of constitutional law. In Marbury, Marshall leavened 
his exposition on judicial responsibility with an extravagant disavowal of any 
motive to “intrude into the cabinet, and to intermeddle with the 
prerogatives of the executive.”157 This legal-cultural template has been 
recycled ever since. 
The sudden, valiant image of the accidental lawgiver forced to act by 
unavoidable circumstances is comforting to the citizenry. This type of 
casting mastered by the American jurist reframes the question of prerogative 
into one of motivation.158 In doing so, the strategy strives to preempt 
concerns that the actor is bent on power usurpation, as hesitation is taken as 
a symptom of the virtues of selflessness and principle. Indeed, the ideal of 
law—even more so than the romantic view of politics—excludes the 
corrupting qualities of personal interest. But in personifying the institution 
in this fashion, the Court is also shading the fact that in most cases tackling 
the matter in the first place was entirely a discretionary decision, as well as 
the fact that interpretive choices are neither preordained nor mechanical 
acts. 
Moreover, through feigned reluctance to exercise judicial review, the 
force necessary to meet the imagined threat to order is accordingly 
characterized as a temporary, extraordinary state of affairs. This signals that 
the judicial intervention is, or should be seen as, limited in scope and 
duration. 
The fact that this visage is still assumed in an age of discretionary review 
reveals not only that it is an entrenched practice, but also that the fable 
continues to resonate with Americans. Because of our acceptance of 
Marbury-inspired accounts of the rule of law, we instinctively appreciate how 
each of the acts in the tale should unfold. The peaceful era is followed by 
the dark times. Once order is rhetorically reestablished through the 
intervention of the Court, its judgment promises to usher in a golden age. 
Having vanquished the latest threat to the realm, the Court withdraws and 
resumes its watchful repose. Joseph Campbell describes this cycle as the 
 
 157. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
 158. This is a time-worn, if effective, tactic. Bickel astutely observed how images can be used 
to legitimize power, noting that this move “obscure[d] the reality that when the Supreme Court 
declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the act of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of 
representatives of the actual people of the here and now . . . .” BICKEL, supra note 89, at 16–17. 
Whether one accepts or rejects Bickel’s premise that judicial review is a countermajoritarian 
institution, he was absolutely correct that ideals, myths, and images have played a crucial role in 
constitutional discourse. 
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“separation-initiation-return” structure of all hero myths.159 Its absorption 
and reproduction through constitutional language helps to build support 
for juristic innovation, sometimes at the expense of other institutional 
actors.160 
IV. BROWN: A TALISMAN OF LIMITATION 
Iconographers teach that symbols are most effective when they exude 
“reverence, simplicity, and sincerity.”161 Sadly, this cannot be said of Brown, 
the path-breaking ruling declaring racially segregated public education a 
violation of equal protection of the laws. To be sure, the decision enjoys a 
special place in popular culture today, but it has been a tarnished relic in 
professional circles since the very start. Brown may have inspired a 
generation of individuals to take up cause lawyering, but with each passing 
year the negative connotations of the case have calcified in the psyche of 
federal judges. The rich symbolic life of the case offers intriguing lessons as 
to how legal icons propel political change and how they are, in turn, remade 
by the very societal events that are unleashed. 
This polysemous symbol will be dissected in two stages. The initial phase 
presents a narrative of Brown’s evolving place in the popular imagination in 
which the decision is initially received as a divisive force, but wins broad 
acceptance among believers over time; this trend is captured in the ruling’s 
influence on the judicial appointments process. Turning to the case law, the 
subsequent step explicates the decision’s uncertain state among jurists, who 
have thus far resisted Brown’s rehabilitation. The gulf between law’s 
shepherds and the laity over one of their most recognizable symbols could 
not be greater. 
A. POPULAR REHABILITATION 
The “advice and consent” phase of the judicial appointments process is 
a hotbed of popular sentiment. Through the prism of the Senate’s labors—
an institution devoted to the keeping of our civic religion—one can chart 
the periods of division and consensus over Brown’s public meaning. 
In the aftermath of the desegregation rulings, elected representatives 
from Southern states took advantage of judicial appointments to score 
political points and voice their constituencies’ repudiation of Brown. During 
the confirmation hearings of William Brennan in 1957 and Potter Stewart 
two years later, both were interrogated over Brown’s premises, indicating that 
the populace had not yet unambiguously embraced the ruling, and 
 
 159. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES 30 (2d ed. 1968). 
 160. Id. at 30. Campbell describes the archetypal hero as the “carrier of the shining blade, 
whose blow . . . will liberate the land.” Id. at 16. 
 161. See STAFFORD, supra note 53, at 31. 
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suggesting that jurists would be wise to take note.162 Indeed, drawing 
attention to the decision’s fragility in those early days, Senator John 
McClellan (D-Ark) declared during Stewart’s hearing: 
This is an issue before the American people today. Some people 
agree with the court’s decision in that case. Others do not. And 
without condemning the institution of the Supreme Court, I think 
those who disagree with it have a right to say so and have a right to 
work within the framework of everything legal to bring about a 
change if they so feel that a change is desirable.163 
There was no tenderness expressed for the fledgling symbol; barely a 
hint of concern offered for the plight of those who suffered under Jim 
Crow’s desolate rule. To the contrary, a plan was conceived in the open to 
suffocate Brown’s transformative potential. 
In the meantime, a Herculean counter-effort to rescue the symbol was 
underway, spurred on by a fierce anti-communist program in which the 
decision burnished America’s Cold War credentials. Government officials 
and opinion leaders eagerly cast the decision as an ecstatic moment of 
liberation and a glorification of distinctly American values.164 This 
collaboration between government, market, and the media had a 
galvanizing internal effect: As Brown served a central component in the 
 
 162. Senator James O. Eastland of the State of Mississippi asked William Brennan: “Do you 
think the Constitution of the United States could have one meaning this week and another 
meaning next week?” Nomination of William J. Brennan, Jr.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 85th Cong. 38 (1957), reprinted in 6 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916–1972, pt. Nomination of William J. 
Brennan, Jr., at 38 (Roy M. Mersky, & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1975) [hereinafter SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES]. Potter Stewart was repeatedly asked by Southern Senators not 
only whether he was a “creative” judge, but also whether he “agree[d] with the view, the 
reasoning, and logic applied . . . and the philosophy expressed by the Supreme Court in 
arriving in its decision in the case of Brown v. Board of Education on May 17, 1954.” Nomination of 
Potter Stewart: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., vol. 1, at 38 (1959), reprinted 
in [1977 Supp.] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, pt. Nomination of Potter 
Stewart, Hearings, vol. 1, at 38; see also id. at 14–18, 39, reprinted in [1977 Supp.] SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, pt. Nomination of Potter Stewart, Hearings., vol. 1, at 14–18, 39 
(questioning by James O. Eastland, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 27–28 
(questions by Sen. Olin D.T. Johnston, South Carolina); id. at 56, 62, reprinted in [1977 Supp.] 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, pt. Nomination of Potter Stewart, Hearings., vol. 
1, at 56, 62 (follow up by Sen. John L. McClennan, Arkansas). See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, 
THE CONFIRMATION MESS 66–68 (1994); John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal 
Judicial Appointments Process Under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRACTICE & PROCESS 1, 
6–7 (2003). 
 163. See Nomination of Potter Stewart: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 
vol. 1, at 34 (1959), reprinted in [1977 Supp.] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 
162, pt. Nomination of Potter Stewart, Hearings., vol. 1, at 34. 
 164. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 107–14 (2000). 
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proselytization of American ideals abroad, it also solidified domestic 
commitment to racial equality at home. 
The decision’s sacramentality remained in flux for much of the next 
two decades, as waves of defiance were met by stalwart judges who finally 
received the institutional backing promised in the government’s legal briefs, 
and as ordinary citizens spilled onto the sidewalks. During this ritual process 
unfolding in the courts and the streets, the community of believers engaged 
a complicated and at times violent exchange over whether and to what 
extent Brown would be an accurate expression of its shared self-
understanding. 
A series of confirmation fights underscored the transitional quality of 
Brown’s iconic status during this period. With each episode, Brown became 
further cemented in the popular imagination. The first milestone was 
Thurgood Marshall’s elevation to the Supreme Court in 1967. Marshall was 
subjected to withering questioning during his confirmation hearing, 
demonstrating that in many quarters Brown and those closely associated with 
its achievement were vulnerable.165 In the end, the former Director of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund was confirmed as an Associate Justice. Coming 
on the heels of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Marshall’s 
ascension to the High Court sounded an optimistic note on Brown’s future. 
The next revelation came during President Nixon’s efforts to fill Abe 
Fortas’s vacancy on the Supreme Court. Nixon’s opening gambit was to 
elevate a conservative jurist from the South. But Clement Haynsworth of the 
Fourth Circuit was rejected in 1969 after several Senators argued that his 
desegregation opinions revealed him to be “a man who seeks to limit the 
Brown case, who seeks to slow down integration, who seeks to hang on to 
segregated ways as long as he can.”166 Nixon’s subsequent nominee, G. 
Harold Carswell, an avowed segregationist before taking the bench, was 
voted down less than a year later.167 Although Carswell—like Haynsworth 
 
 165. Marshall was asked whether he believed the Supreme Court to be an “instrument of 
social change” and whether he was “prejudiced against white people in the South.” Nomination 
of Thurgood Marshall: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 159, 161 (1967), 
reprinted in 7 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 162, pt. Nomination of 
Thurgood Marshall, at 159, 161 (1975). In an extended exchange, Senator Strom Thurmond of 
South Carolina took Marshall through a highly detailed tour of constitutional history and 
interpretation in an effort to show him to be unqualified. Id. at 161–69, reprinted in 7 THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 162, pt. Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, 
at 161–69 (1975). 
 166. Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st 
Cong. 108, 429 (1969) (testimony of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.). See generally Brad Snyder, How the 
Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383 (2000) (arguing 
that conservatives had a leading role in securing Brown’s status in the upper echelon of 
canonical decisions). 
 167. Haynsworth was defeated by a vote of 45–55; Carswell by a vote of 45–51. Senate Rejects 
Carswell by 51-45 Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1970, at 1; Warren Weaver, Jr., Senate Bars 
Haynsworth, 55-45, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1969, at 1. 
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before him—promised to uphold Brown, his vow rang hollow given his past 
statements approving white supremacy and his record as a judge on issues of 
race. The seat was eventually filled by Harry Blackmun. 
By the time Nixon appointed William Rehnquist to the High Court in 
1971, the lessons from the episode had been learned by all. Unlike the 
previous nominees, Rehnquist neither hailed from the South nor had a 
staunch pro-segregation record. In an effort to undermine his fitness for 
judicial office, Democratic Senators questioned the nominee extensively 
about Brown and his role in crafting a legal memorandum for Justice Robert 
Jackson that discussed the plaintiffs’ claims dismissively and urged the 
affirmation of Plessy.168 Nevertheless, he was confirmed with ease, as his 
advice as a young law clerk was deemed not to be disqualifying in light of his 
repeated pledge to uphold Brown.169 
By the mid-1980s, the popular reconstruction of Brown was mostly 
complete. The New York Times, wary of looking gauzy-eyed on previous 
anniversaries of the decision,170 in 1984 openly called for dancing in the 
streets: 
168. Rehnquist’s memo to Justice Jackson, which was titled, A Random Thought on the
Segregation Cases, characterized the school children’s claims as asking the Court “to read its own 
sociological views into the Constitution” and as an invitation to engage in Lochner-style 
jurisprudence. Nomination of William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 324–25 (1986), reprinted in 
12 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 162, at 634–35 (1989). It continued: 
[A]ppellants seek to convince the Court of the moral wrongness of the treatment
they are receiving. I would suggest that this is a question the Court need never
reach; for regardless of the Justice’s individual views on the merits of segregation,
it quite clearly is not one of those extreme cases which commands intervention
from one of any conviction.
Id. at 325, reprinted in 12 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 162, at 635 (1989). 
The memo closed with the following statement: 
I realize that it is an unpopular and unhumanitarian position, for which I have 
been excoriated by ‘liberal’ colleagues, but I think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and 
should be re-affirmed. If the Fourteenth Amendment did not enact Spencer’s 
Social Statics, it just as surely did not enact Myrdal’s American Dilemna [sic]. 
Id. 
169. Nomination of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong. 55 (1971), reprinted in 8 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 
162, pt. Nomination of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Hearings, at 55 (1975) 
(“‘[T]o the extent that a decision is not only unanimous at the time it is handed down, but has 
been repeatedly reaffirmed by a changing group of judges, such as Brown v. Board of Education, it 
seems to me there is no question but what that is the law of the land . . . .’” (quoting 
Rehnquist)). 
170. On Brown’s tenth anniversary, a coalition was forming behind it, but the project was
described as having barely begun. See Editorial, Decade of Desegregation, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1964, 
at E10 (saying that “the commitment to equal opportunity is irrevocable, the outcome certain,” 
but cautioning that “its real implementation lies with the people”). In 1979, on Brown’s twenty-
fifth anniversary, The New York Times boldly claimed that “[t]here does not appear to be much to 
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Anniversaries of Supreme Court decisions don’t usually inspire 
celebration. But nothing less is in order this week, the 30th 
anniversary of the decision by which the Court struck down its own 
colossally wrong acceptance of “separate but equal” treatment for 
blacks and whites in the preceding half century. To celebrate Brown 
v. Board of Education is to celebrate a continuing revolution in 
America’s race relations . . . . It is a living monument, a cause for 
celebration.171 
Still, not all is rosy. Brown’s rehabilitation has come at a high price: 
anticlassification vernacular, once employed to insulate the decision from 
attacks on its legitimacy, has completely overtaken the ruling’s 
antisubordination roots.172 As a result, most Americans today equate the 
ruling with the simplistic notion that race-consciousness is legally untenable. 
That is to say, in order to render the case palatable to a broad cross-section 
of the polity, the vision of law associated with Brown has been progressively 
thinned and flattened. 
Rehnquist’s elevation to the position of Chief Justice ran into somewhat 
greater difficulty than his seating as an Associate Justice. The controversy 
over his Brown memo made its reappearance, but it was a feature of his 
defense that most stood out. His many citations to the decision as a member 
of the Court were touted by his champions as evidence of his commitment 
to Brown as “good law.”173 There followed no detailed examination of the 
ways in which Rehnquist had limited its scope. Nevertheless, his apparent 
validations of Brown inoculated him from the fiercest of critiques. Rehnquist 
was confirmed as Chief Justice, though a record number of Senators—thirty-
three—voted “nay” for a confirmed appointee.174 
Equally important, Robert Bork’s confirmation defeat in 1987 
illustrated the newfound gravitational pull exerted by Brown.175 In a widely-
 
celebrate about school desegregation at the moment . . . .” Editorial, An Age of Liberation, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 17, 1979, at A22. However, it noted that “[t]oday it is clear that Brown was 
monumental because of how it has changed American life. . . . Brown initiated much 
educational reform—and much of the nation’s social progress of the last 25 years.” Id. Deep 
popular support of the decision is also reflected in editorial statements made on the decision’s 
fiftieth anniversary. See Bob Herbert, Regressing on Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at A23 
(stating that “there is no way to overstate the change set in motion by the brilliant and dogged 
team of lawyers who developed and worked so hard and long on Brown v. Board. . . . [It was] a 
profound and far-reaching decision . . . .”). 
 171. Editorial, The Enduring Promise of Brown, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1984, at A26. 
 172. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1497–1500 (2004). 
 173. See Nomination of William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 302–05 (1986), reprinted in 
12 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 162, at 612–15 (1989) (listing the thirty-
four cases in which Justice Rehnquist cited the Brown decision) . 
 174. CARTER, supra note 162, at 79. 
 175. See id. at 48–49. 
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read article published in The New Republic, Bork had once denounced the 
integration of public accommodations and decried the sit-ins as “mob”-like 
behavior.176 Compounding his problems, when he was asked by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee which opinion he found to be the most criticized 
ruling by the High Court, he truthfully but injudiciously offered, “Brown v. 
Board of Education.”177 Although Bork had always defended Brown in 
originalist terms, his enthusiastic support of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had 
an air of deathbed conversion about it.178 The icon of racial equality was now 
on the move, and Bork’s earlier writings casting doubt on anti-
discrimination laws put him firmly on the wrong side of history. With 
Brown’s power at its apex, Bork’s nomination was soundly defeated, 58–42.179 
Today, Brown signifies the moment when America’s twin bounties of 
liberty and equality were bestowed upon the oppressed. At least in public, 
would-be jurists and elected officials must swear allegiance to the idol with a 
modicum of sincerity. One cannot be called to shepherd the people’s 
constitution without a show of humility and reverence for their values. 
This ebb and flow of ordinary citizens’ affections for Brown is confirmed 
in opinion polls. A Gallup poll taken in 1954 revealed that a bare majority of 
Americans—52%—agreed with the decision in its infancy, while 44% 
disapproved.180 Complicating matters, a full 40% of those polled in 1954 
believed that the best route to long-term peace was to permit racial 
segregation in those areas where it then existed rather than to mandate 
 
 176. Robert Bork, Civil Rights—A Challenge, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21, 23. In the 
article, Bork vociferously opposed the proposed civil rights laws on the ground that it would 
deprive businesspeople of their “vital liberty” by forcing them to “serve persons with whom they 
do not wish to associate.” Id. at 22. He also described the legislation as an unjustified imposition 
of “the morals of the majority self-righteously imposed upon a minority,” likening the banning 
of racial discrimination in public accommodations to the prohibition of alcohol. Id. at 21. 
 177. Nomination of Robert Bork: Hearings Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 132 
(1987), reprinted in 14 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 162, at 312 (1990) 
(testifying that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original promise of equality had to be re-
interpreted in light of the false “background assumption” that state-sponsored racial separation 
was consistent with equal protection of law); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some 
First Amendment Problems 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1971) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“was intended to enforce a core idea of black equality against government discrimination”). 
 178. See Nomination of Robert Bork: Hearings Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 132 
(1987), reprinted in 14 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 162, at 312 (1990). 
 179. Appealing to society’s newfound commitment to racial equality, Senator Edward 
Kennedy gave a fiery floor speech that set the tone for what would be a contentious proceeding: 
Robert Bork’s America is a land in which . . . Blacks would sit at segregated lunch 
counters . . . . and the doors of the federal courts would be shut on the fingers of 
millions of Americans for whom the judiciary is—and is often the only—protector 
of the individual rights that are the heart of our democracy. 
 133 CONG. REC. 59188-01 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), 1987 WL 
941258. 
 180. The Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll (Dec. 31, 1954–Jan. 5, 1955), Westlaw, Poll 
Database, Question ID: USGallup.54-541 Q24. 
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integration.181 Public reaction to Brown revealed not only a polarized 
electorate, but also tolerance for a brand of accommodation over 
segregation reminiscent of the compromise over slavery reached a century 
before.182 
It took the shocking news of intensive and often violent Southern 
resistance to coax most citizens off the proverbial fence and onto the side of 
racial equality. By 1961, the number that signaled allegiance to Brown had 
climbed to 66%.183 When the same poll was conducted in 1994, a generation 
after the Warren Court made its fateful leap into the abyss, a full 88% of the 
populace had come to embrace non-discrimination as a central tenet of the 
American creed.184 To the faithful, Brown is a miracle that cannot be entirely 
explained by social scientists or opinion-makers. It stands as an act of 
devotion, its very existence vindicating our hope in the law. 
B. THE CLOSING OF THE JUDICIAL MIND 
Whatever judges might profess in other settings, their feelings for the 
case-turned-symbol once they take the bench have been another matter 
entirely. My central claims are threefold. First, while the image of Brown is 
now florid in the public imagination, it has become a fallen memorial for a 
significant number of legal intellectuals. The searing experience of 
desegregation has been etched in the minds of the Justices, undermining 
their own faith in Brown’s force. Second, the negative connotations of the 
case have infected more areas of doctrine than one might have expected. 
Brown now stands as a monument to law’s limits and institutional self-regard; 
it denotes fear and hand-wringing. Third, the ascendance of Marbury during 
the last fifty years as the preeminent symbol of federal judicial authority has 
coincided with the steady emergence of Brown as a counter-symbol of law. 
But where Marbury so often stimulates feigned reluctance as a way of 
legitimating the actual exercise of juridic prerogative, Brown signals genuine, 
palpable hesitation to wield it. 
 
 181. The Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll (Oct. 15, 1954–Oct. 20, 1954), Westlaw, Poll 
Database, Question ID: USGallup.54-538 QK13. 
 182. I am thinking of the Missouri Compromise codified in the Act of March 6, 1820, 3 
Stat. 545, 548 which had the effect of permitting slavery where it then existed, but establishing 
land north of 36°, 30” as a slavery-free zone. Additionally, Maine was carved out of 
Massachusetts and admitted to the Union as a free state, while Missouri was admitted as a slave 
state. Id. 
 183. The Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll (May 28, 1961–June, 2, 1961), Westlaw, Poll 
Database, Question ID: USGallup.61-646 R04. Given three choices in a 1954 poll, 33% of the 
respondents preferred enforcement of integration “gradually and over a period of years,” 22% 
favored immediate integration, and 40% believed that it would be best to “keep[] segregation 
in those areas where it has been the practice up to now.” The Gallup Organization, supra note 
181. 
 184. The Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll (Apr. 22, 1994–Apr. 24, 1994), Westlaw, Poll 
Database, Question ID: USGallup.422045 Q29. 
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Yet even as the decision catalyzed the civil rights movement, all the 
while its value as a unifying emblem of judicial influence was rapidly 
eroding. In this sense, then, the story of Brown’s transformation from 
decision to universal icon is not simply about a contest over its meaning, it is 
also a tale in which negative meanings of the symbol have mostly prevailed, 
while positive connotations have been vanquished. 
A case like Brown more accurately illustrates the actual breadth of 
courts’ province in the modern age than a Marbury, but the swirling crisis 
with which it was associated is far too fresh, too protracted, and therefore 
too problematic to serve as a means of gathering the flock. 
1. Fractured Meanings 
The shattered, diluted meanings of Brown reveal not only the 
fragmentation of law, but also that of political faith. Law’s shepherds 
continue to conjure unwelcoming visions with the symbol, defying the 
cultural transformation that occurred in society as a whole. Furthermore, 
the federal courts’ frustrating experiences with desegregation have affected 
the path of the law. Both of these factors—the multiplicity and negativity of 
the legal symbol’s cultural associations—have undermined its potential. 
Consider these trends. 
a. Weakened Conceptions of Equality 
The single most potent line of symbolic deployments of Brown remains 
the construction of the ideal of equal citizenship. While Brown is most often 
unfurled in a case involving race or educational matters,185 where it heralds a 
commitment to notions of citizenship and anti-discrimination, it is waved 
less frequently and with considerably less enthusiasm outside of these 
contexts. 
But as deployments of Brown in the discrimination or educational 
contexts have become more ringing, they have also come to signify a 
narrower terrain: substantive equality (or antisubordination)186 has 
transmuted into color-blindness (or anticlassification);187 race-conscious 
 
 185. On Brown’s role in education settings, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003); 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 928 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 372 n.1 (1981) 
(Powell, J., concurring); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (1978). 
 186. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 49 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) (describing “society’s 
deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person’s race or the color of 
his or her skin”); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 248 n.4 (1964) (raising Brown as a symbol for 
the elimination of the vestiges of slavery). 
 187. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (“Carried to its logical 
extreme, the idea that black students are better off with black teachers could lead to the very 
system the Court rejected in Brown v. Bd. of Educ.” (citation omitted)); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448, 516 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (“At least since the decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education, the Court has been resolute in its dedication to the principle that the Constitution 
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admissions are no longer couched in the language of racial justice, but of 
access to a diverse and stimulating educational experience. 
This dynamic is graphically depicted in the pair of affirmative action 
decisions involving the University of Michigan. Putting an end to the 
sectarian strife unleashed by its own fractured theology, the High Court 
sanctioned multiculturalism as a tenet of the American Creed.188 
For Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,189 
the victorious version of Brown stands for fair access to educational 
opportunities—no less and no more. This incarnation of Brown, refracted 
through the prism of Bakke, lights the way toward the removal of obstacles to 
a fair “diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of 
higher learning.”190 As a result, race-conscious admissions policies enjoy 
Brown’s aura, but barely so. They are constitutionally permissible only if they 
represent a stop-gap measure and the policies themselves lack mathematical 
precision as to the value of race actually accorded to any particular 
individual.191 
Standing in tension with this understanding of Brown is a rendering of 
the icon as a socio-legal imperative to efface the vestiges of slavery.192 
Quoting a law review article by Stephen Carter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg argues 
in her Gratz dissent that reducing Brown to “freedom from categorization . . . 
is to trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have suffered under 
racism.”193 Yet this vision of law has lost much of its drawing power. In the 
 
envisions a Nation where race is irrelevant.” (citation omitted)); Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256, 272 (1979) (“A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively 
invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.”). 
 188. Justice Powell’s concurring decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 271–72 (1978), approving diversity but explicitly joined by no other member of the 
Court, garnered much debate and confusion in the lower courts. Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 84 
F.3d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the diversity rationale), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 
F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002) (approving the diversity goal as a compelling interest), aff’d, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003). 
 189. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331. 
 190. Id. (“‘[E]ducation . . . is the very foundation of good citizenship.’ For this reason, the 
diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher education must 
be accessible to all individual regardless of race or ethnicity.” (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 191. Robert Post observes that the combined rationale of Grutter-Gratz is potentially far-
reaching in its acceptance of a linkage between diversity and the legitimacy of public leaders, 
and that the requirement of “individualized consideration” is undercut by the Court’s 
preference for policies that use race in ways that are not overly “identifiable.” Post, supra note 
18, at 69–70. 
 192. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (describing Brown as a symbol of the 
end of the “law-enforced racial caste system, itself the legacy of centuries of slavery”). 
 193. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Ginsburg 
stated: 
‘[T]o say that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil rights have been 
mostly about freedom from racial categorization rather than freedom from racial 
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past quarter century, governing elites have backed away from modes of 
discourse that connote large-scale social transformation. 
b. Whither the Living Constitution? 
For a time jurists dispatched the decision freely in support of flexibility 
in interpretive methodology, particularly with respect to the authoritative 
use of history. However, the last instance in which Brown was cited for this 
cautionary principle in a majority opinion occurred over a quarter century 
ago, in the 1976 case of Elrod v. Burns.194 Every effort to activate Brown in this 
fashion since then appears in either a dissenting or concurring opinion—
what I call unrepresentative instances of legal symbolism.195 
Such solo flourishes may sparkle brilliantly, but reflect no institutional 
consensus as to a legal symbol’s active meaning. Harry Blackmun’s 
dissenting citation of Brown in Bowers v. Hardwick196 and Justice Stevens’s 
unaccompanied reference to it in Marsh v. Chambers197 are the paradigmatic 
examples of unrepresentative symbolism—they serve more as a hopeful 
 
oppression is to trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have suffered under 
racism. To pretend . . . that the issue presented in Bakke was the same issue in 
Brown is to pretend that history never happened and that the present doesn’t 
exist.’ 
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen 
to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 433–34 (1988))). Justice Ginsburg’s opinion was joined by Justices 
Souter and Breyer. Id. at 298. 
 194. 427 U.S. 347, 354–55 (1976) (“Our inquiry does not begin with the judgment of 
history, though the actual operation of a practice viewed in retrospect may help to assess its 
workings with respect to constitutional limitations.”); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 
(1967); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1966); Frank v. 
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371 (1959). 
 195. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 957 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting); Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 82 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of 
Obstetricians v. Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 787–88 (1986) (Burger, J., dissenting); City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 80 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation 
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 367 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 
816 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 836 n.7 (1982) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326–27 (1978) 
(Opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackman, J.J.); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 354–
55 (1976); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 564 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring); Cohen v. Hurley, 
366 U.S. 117, 142 n.23 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 196. 478 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that either the length of 
time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw 
legislation from this Court's scrutiny.” (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954))). 
 197. 463 U.S. at 816 & n.35 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“We have recognized in a wide variety 
of constitutional contexts that the practices that were in place at the time any particular 
guarantee was enacted into the Constitution do not necessarily fix forever the meaning of that 
guarantee. ” (citing Brown, 347 U.S. 483)). 
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beacon of future meaning than as a descriptor of a commonly accepted 
significance. 
At all events, jurists usually do not desire to highlight their interpretive 
innovations, for fear that doing so blunts the persuasive force of their 
utterances. But on those rare occasions when creativity is acknowledged, 
Brown no longer is viewed by the institution as a whole to be the best vehicle 
for expressing its commitment to a living Constitution. 
c. Hope Fades 
Early on, Brown projected an expansive hope in constitutional remedies, 
perseverance in matters of principle, and legal possibility.198 By contrast, 
where the amulet is raised today to characterize the scope and importance 
of a constitutional injury, it is usually used to divide the populace or signal 
the closing of the judicial mind to inventiveness and social complexity. It is 
alarming to see just how routinely the tumultuous legacy of Brown is openly 
cited for the proposition that the project of desegregation has warped the 
federal court system, undermined democratic institutions, and promoted 
cultural conflict.199 Writing separately in the 1990 case Missouri v. Jenkins, 
 
 198. Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 229 (1987); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 
677, 727 n.18 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 283 (1977); Beal 
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 461 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 
503 n.2 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 354–55; Gilmore v. City of 
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 571 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 
(1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126, 133 (1970); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 
144, 151–52 (1970); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 455 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 498 n.2 (1968); Harper v. Va. 
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1966); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 248 n.4 
(1964); see id. at 287, 316 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 
(1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 295 n.7 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 
(1963); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 
182 (1960); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 175 (1959); Frank, 359 U.S. at 371 n.15; Cooper 
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 199. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 87 (1995) (“It would not serve the important objective 
of Brown . . . to seek to use school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope.”); see id. 
at 119 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The District Court’s willingness to adopt such stereotypes 
stemmed from a misreading of our earliest school desegregation case.”); see also Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98, 152–53 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 500 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e must resolve—if not today, then soon—what is to be done in the 
vast majority of other districts, where, though our cases continue to profess that judicial 
oversight of school operations is a temporary expedient, democratic processes remain 
suspended, with no prospect of restoration, 38 years after Brown.”); see id. at 509 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (“It is almost 38 years since this Court decided Brown v. Board. In those 38 years the 
students in DeKalb County, Ga., never have attended a desegregated school system even for one 
day.” (citation omitted)); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 479–80 (1979) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (claiming that there is a “now widely accepted view that a quarter of a 
century after Brown I, the federal judiciary should be limiting rather than expanding the extent 
to which courts are operating the public school systems of our country.” (citation omitted)); see 
id. at 489 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The school desegregation remedy imposed on the 
Columbus school system . . . is as complete and dramatic a displacement of local authority by 
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which overturned a desegregation order that directly raised property taxes, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that “[t]he historical record of Brown v. 
Board of Education is not a proud chapter in our constitutional history . . . . 
But courage and skill must be exercised with due regard for the proper and 
historic role of the courts.”200 
The collapse of rule and symbol can be traced to the mid-1970s. Two 
desegregation opinions authored by Lewis Powell, a judicial moderate, 
expressed sentiments similar to that of Justice Kennedy, but a full decade 
earlier. In 1979, Justice Powell dissented from a desegregation ruling in 
order to give voice to “the now widely accepted view that a quarter of a 
century after Brown v. Board of Education, the federal judiciary should be 
limiting rather than expanding the extent to which courts are operating the 
public school systems of our country.”201 Prophesying Brown’s fading light, 
he announced that America’s need for the decision had come to an end: 
“The type of state-enforced segregation that Brown I properly condemned no 
longer exists in this country. . . . System-wide remedies . . . lack any 
principled basis.”202 
Although Powell spoke for himself and no other, he did so in the wake 
of the earth-shaking decision of Milliken v. Bradley,203 which imposed 
substantial curbs on remedies to equalize educational resources and slow the 
pace of white flight from urban centers.204 Giving voice to a latent 
disillusionment now spreading among the federal judiciary, Justice Powell 
offered this analysis: 
Experience in recent years . . . has cast serious doubt upon the 
efficacy of far-reaching judicial remedies . . . the fact is that 
restructuring and overseeing the operation of major public school 
the federal judiciary as is possible in our federal system. . . . [A]s this Court recognized in Brown 
I ‘education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.’” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977))); Wright v. 
Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 471 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court does not 
articulate the standard by which it reaches this conclusion, and its result far exceeds the 
contemplation of Brown v. Board of Education, and all succeeding cases . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
200. 495 U.S. 33, 80 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part & concurring in the
judgment). This dissent was joined by Chief Justices Rehnquist, and Justices O’Connor and 
Scalia. For citations to Brown as representative of a period of social strife and institutional 
defiance, see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 355 (2003); see id. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 781–82 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Adickes, 398 U.S. at 
197; Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 149 (1965); England v. La. State Bd. of Med. 
Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 431–32 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Braden v. United States, 365 
U.S. 431, 446 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Harrison, 360 U.S. at 175; see id. at 181–82 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); and Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344, 346 (1959). 
201. Penick, 443 U.S. at 480 (Powell, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 486–87.
203. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
204. Id. at 752–73.
TSAI_FINAL.DOC 5/2/2005  10:18 AM 
1142 90  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2005] 
systems—as ordered in these cases—fairly can be viewed as social 
engineering that hardly is appropriate for the federal judiciary.205 
A year later, Justice Powell built upon this theme of disaffection: “In all too 
many cities, well-intentioned court decrees have had the primary effect of 
stimulating resegregation. . . . The promise of Brown v. Board of Education 
cannot be fulfilled by continued imposition of self-defeating remedies.”206 
The federal courts had begun their inward turn. 
Despite the Warren Court’s careful strategy of separating constitutional 
rule from remedy, by the 1970s Brown’s luster had been greatly diminished 
by judges’ own negative experiences with desegregation remedies and what 
they perceived to be the public’s reaction to them. 
2. Spillover Effects
Far from enjoying a renaissance, Brown has garnered a sizeable 
following as a symbol of discontent among law’s custodians in the years since 
Justice Powell penned his words. The negative associations with 
desegregation have rapidly spilled beyond the Equal Protection Clause, 
dramatically altering the substance and direction of the law. 
By the 1990s, the Judiciary’s reimagination of Brown had crystallized: 
where before it signaled duty and steadfastness—some of the positive 
modern connotations of Marbury—it now signified the limits of judicial 
power and an enhanced sense of institutional self-regard. A universal symbol 
of redemption had been so far eroded that it now mostly stood for a 
guarantee of formal equality for a very rare social injury. 
Instead of legal possibility or an optimistic sense of purpose, to judges 
and lawyers the case now “signal[s] an end to [an] era” in the nation’s 
history.207 Indeed, the case reporters are replete with instances in which 
mention of the decision perpetuates the belief that Brown’s legacy is its role 
in sparking mobilized resistance or testing the limits of federal authority and 
expertise.208 
These themes were played out in the contentious battle over the scope 
of the right to abortion. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the plurality opinion 
transparently explored the idea that the Court’s legitimacy is a “product of 
substance and perception.”209 In justifying their decision to affirm the core 
205. Penick, 443 U.S. at 487.
206. Estes v. Metro Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 438–39 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
207. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983); see also Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring) (“[Brown,] after prolonged 
resistance, yielded an end to a law-enforced racial caste system, itself the legacy of centuries of 
slavery.”). 
208. See supra notes 199–200.
209. 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJJ.).
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of Roe on stare decisis grounds, Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter 
found occasion to discuss Brown’s legacy. 
This elaboration is instructive on three fronts. First, Casey occasioned no 
impassioned defense of Brown, no ringing affirmation of law as a progressive 
force. Instead, the Justices cast Brown as a matter in which profound cultural 
change justified a decisive break from the past. Illustrating the psychological 
isolation of Brown from the day to day affairs of constitutional lawmaking, 
the plurality wrote: “Society’s understanding of the facts upon which a 
constitutional ruling was sought in 1954,” namely, whether state-mandated 
separation of the races would stigmatize black Americans, “was thus 
fundamentally different from the basis claimed for the [Plessy] decision in 
1896.”210 This move characterized Brown as an historical anomaly from which 
general lessons about judicial decision-making should not be drawn. 
Second, the members of the plurality conspicuously linked Roe and 
Brown as the only two “intensively divisive controversies” in their lifetimes in 
which a legal ruling “calls the contending sides of a national controversy to 
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the 
Constitution.”211 Thus, Brown had by that point penetrated the judicial 
psyche as a “rare” case.212 The Justices presumed the existence of a 
fellowship of persons who shared these sentiments, placing Roe on similar 
footing because of public backlash and official resistance associated with the 
abortion ruling. 
Third, Brown’s symbolism redirected the constitutional law of privacy. 
Even as members of the plurality gave a ringing endorsement to the 
importance of remaining steadfast amid the swirling forces of political 
conflict, they also dramatically reworked doctrine in response to these very 
dynamics. Almost as if it were a silent nod to Brown II’s flexible “all 
deliberate speed” formulation,213 the Casey ruling affirmed the right to 
abortion, but then scrapped the trimester framework, replacing it with a far 
more malleable “undue burden” test.214 As successors to titanic statements of 
law met by a sustained outcry, each can be seen as a retreat from its 
predecessor’s lofty ambitions. 
Perhaps most striking of all is Justice O’Connor’s ruling in Virginia v. 
Black215 approving state authority to outlaw the most aggressive and 
 
 210. Id. at 863. 
 211. Id. at 866–67. Interestingly enough, Thurgood Marshall himself made an earlier 
version of this argument: “When this Court decided Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, it properly 
embarked on a course of constitutional adjudication no less controversial than that begun by 
Brown v. Board of Education.” Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 461 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted). 
 212. Casey, 505 U.S. at 866. 
 213. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (“Brown II”). 
 214. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 215. 538 U.S. 343, 355 (2003). 
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intimidating forms of cross-burning.216 The opinion invokes and thereby 
perpetuates Brown’s lasting link to racial strife in the judicial imagination. 
Recounting the history of cross-burning as a tool of racial terror and adding 
judicial imprimatur to a ban on the most virulent displays, Justice O’Connor 
reminded Americans that “[t]he decision of this Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education, along with the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, 
sparked another outbreak of Klan violence. These acts of violence included 
bombings, beatings, shootings, stabbings, and mutilations.”217 
In the aftermath of RAV v. City of St. Paul,218 there had been significant 
doubt as to whether any hate-crimes law that singled out disfavored 
messages—even historically and sociologically unique speech-acts such as 
cross-burning—could pass constitutional muster. The Court’s use of Brown 
in the Black case therefore effectuated a subtle, but crucial, recalibration of 
First Amendment doctrine to rein in the judicial sphere, thereby permitting 
a greater degree of political novelty in deterring this fear-inspiring behavior. 
Ironically, Brown’s legacy has even been invoked to rationalize 
procedural rules that make it easier for defendants to secure the 
modification (or the dismantling) of a consent decree, and not just in 
desegregation cases. The intractable association of Brown with the advent of 
public law litigation is recycled in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,219 a 
case that arose from local officials’ decision to enter into a consent decree to 
build a new jail after inmates filed suit alleging inhumane conditions.220 
Years later, the Sheriff moved to modify the decree to permit double 
bunking and thereby increase the capacity of the institution, a motion 
vigorously opposed by the inmates.221 
Byron White’s majority opinion in Rufo, establishing that any 
“significant change” could form the basis for a modification to a governing 
consent decree, explicitly drew on Brown’s association with protracted, 
complex lawsuits, which seems to have lacerated the institution’s psyche: 
“The upsurge in institutional reform litigation since Brown v. Board of 
Education, has made the ability of a district court to modify a decree in 
response to changed circumstances all the more important.”222 
 
 216. Id. at 363. 
 217. Id. at 355. Justice Thomas would have gone further by treating cross-burning as 
unprotected conduct rather than presumptively expression. Id. at 393 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
Reminding readers of the State’s campaign of “massive resistance” to Brown, he argued that the 
same legislature that fiercely protected its prerogative over racial segregation would not have 
enacted an anti-cross burning statute that reached merely racist expression. Id. at 394. 
 218. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 219. 502 U.S. 367 (1992). 
 220. Id. at 373–75. 
 221. Id. at 376. 
 222. Id. at 380. 
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It is hard to know precisely what sorts of changes warrant such 
modification; the Court left this question shockingly open-ended. One thing 
is clear: maintaining “flexibility” for judges to wade into social life and to 
extricate themselves cleanly appeared to be the primary motivation.223 
Without saying much else, the Justices’ invocation of Brown recalled lasting 
disappointments over desegregation, the image of overburdened courts, and 
the intractability of many social problems. As we would come to see in Bush 
v. Gore, this would not be the last time Brown’s iconic status was manipulated 
to promote a form of judicial withdrawal borne of an ethos of institutional 
self-preservation.224 
Finally, consider Justice Clarence Thomas’s invocation of Brown in the 
dispute over the constitutionality of the State of Ohio’s school voucher 
program just three Terms ago. Writing separately in support of the decision 
in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris to uphold the pilot program, Justice Thomas 
conjured Brown as a failed vision of equal education: 
Today many of our inner-city public schools deny emancipation to 
urban minority students. Despite this Court’s observation nearly 50 
years ago in Brown v. Board of Education that ‘it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of an education,’ urban children have been forced 
into a system that continually fails them.225 
Justice Thomas did not deploy the case analogically to argue that the 
segregation decision’s internal logic justified the state’s creation of the 
voucher program; nor could he credibly do so. Instead, Brown’s symbolic 
importance was to relax jurists’ reading of the Establishment Clause so as to 
permit policy experimentation. The federal courts’ efforts to enforce the 
Equal Protection Clause did little to ameliorate stark disparities in 
educational quality, he implied, and now other constitutional guarantees 
must give way. 
By the end of the 20th Century, the ultimate act of socio-legal 
restoration had been reimagined by law’s shepherds as a diminished sign of 
discontent. But as the previous decisions illustrate, even a misshapen 
monument can prove useful in the reconfiguration of legal categories and 
rules. 
 
 223. The Court held that district courts have “flexibility” in changing the terms of a consent 
order flowing from institutional reform lawsuits. Id. The fact that compliance had become 
“more onerous” or that one of the parties “misunderstood” the law was also deemed a valid 
ground to redo a decree. Id. at 390, 392. 
 224. See generally infra text accompanying notes 239–244. 
 225. 536 U.S. 639, 676 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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C. MARBURY V. BROWN: SYMBOL AND ANTI-SYMBOL
It is customary to understand Brown as a decision that is yoked to Plessy 
v. Ferguson.226 When Brown was decided in 1954, this had the effect of
reversing the priority of the majority opinion and John Marshall Harlan’s
dissenting opinion in Plessy within the legal canon: Harlan’s losing account
became tied to Brown, while Plessy’s majority opinion was relegated to the
anti-canon.227
In more recent days, however, one can detect an emerging dynamic 
that is at once fascinating and deeply troubling: Marbury and Brown have 
become tethered to each other as symbol and anti-symbol. On these 
revealing occasions, the warring conceptions of the federal Judiciary’s 
sphere of influence and its self-understanding in the modern age take on 
greater clarity and significance. 
Unleashed in judicial writings, Marbury stakes out an expansive vision of 
law and facilitates social acceptance of judicial control and creativity even as 
it denies this is happening. As its opposite number, Brown undermines or 
retards judicial lawmaking, whether through the contraction of substantive 
rights or procedural rules. Linked in this fashion, the rulings also comprise a 
duality in terms of institutional orientation: the first symbol is suggestive of 
an other-regarding sensibility; the second, an ethic of bureaucratic self-
preservation. Where Marbury builds the people’s faith in the courts, Brown 
redirects their faith in the law toward the sphere of politics. 
The two cases appeared together for the first time in the epic decision 
of Cooper v. Aaron,228 which rejected the Little Rock school district’s request 
for a stay of integration in light of the State of Alabama’s strategies of 
delay.229 The symbolic union of Marbury and Brown in the Court’s unanimous 
opinion was a rhetorical tour de force designed to blunt an unparalleled 
degree of resistance to the nascent principle of racial equality: 
[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that 
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the 
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our 
constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case 
is the supreme law of the land. . . . No state legislator or executive 
226. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See generally JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
SHOULD HAVE SAID 12 (2001) (“If Brown is a canonical case, Plessy has become an anticanonical 
case, Brown’s evil twin.”). 
227. See generally Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243
(1998). 
228. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (per curiam).
229. Id. at 4.
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or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating 
his undertaking to support it.230 
This shining moment was short-lived. From Cooper onward, the cases-
turned-symbols would remain linked, but the cultural-legal connotations of 
Marbury and Brown would begin to diverge. Marbury, sharpened into an 
awesome instrument of judicial vigor, carved a path of expanding 
jurisdiction and doctrinal creativity. At the same time, jurists occasionally 
raised Brown as a shield behind which to urge a hasty retreat from the social 
landscape. What symbols do, anti-symbols undo. 
This thematic mélange was sounded in the redistricting case, Miller v. 
Johnson.231 I have already mentioned the opinion’s insistent, highly-charged 
display of the three-pointed star of Marbury, Cooper v. Aaron, and Baker v. Carr 
to legitimate its interpretive act.232 Deferring in any way to the expertise of 
voting rights officials in the Executive Branch, Justice Kennedy warned 
ominously, would amount to “surrender” of the judicial role.233 Again, the 
rhetoric of solemn duty had the effect of perpetuating the view that the 
courts are best placed to calibrate and safeguard the rights of the people. 
A little noticed fact is that the Justices in Miller twice manipulated Brown 
to curb juridic authority. First, the majority deployed the case to signify race 
neutrality, thus restraining government on substantive grounds from 
“separat[ing] its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of 
race.”234 
Second, Justice Stevens, in dissent, deigned to invoke Brown as a 
constraint on the federal courts’ sphere of influence. Going further than his 
fellow dissenters, he argued that those who had lodged objections to the 
majority black districts did not raise a constitutional injury of the same 
gravity as the Brown plaintiffs, who had been completely excluded from 
participation in a civic institution on account of their race. In the absence of 
proof of vote dilution, he suggested, the Miller plaintiffs had simply not 
suffered a constitutional injury.235 
A similar portrait of dueling legal symbols appeared in Casey. Even as 
the plurality read Brown in a way that approved the Court’s refusal to 
reengage a full-bore review of Roe’s merits,236 Antonin Scalia’s dissent turned 
to Marbury as a counterpoint to discredit the decision as a form of “selective” 
230. Id. at 18.
231. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 115–121.
233. Miller, 515 U.S. at 922.
234. Id. at 911. The Court clarified that in order to prevail on an equal protection claim a
plaintiff must show “that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision 
to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.” Id. at 916. 
235. Id. at 931 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992).
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judicial review.237 Exasperated with his colleagues’ lack of interest in 
entertaining Roe’s flaws, he complained: 
I confess never to have heard of this new, keep-what-you-want-and-
throw-away-the-rest version. I wonder whether, as applied to 
Marbury v. Madison, for example, the new version of stare decisis 
would be satisfied if we allowed courts to review the 
constitutionality of only those statutes that (like the one in 
Marbury) pertain to the jurisdiction of the courts.238 
Once again, the citizen-audience was treated to a skirmish between the two 
icons of juridic influence: one representing a vision of interpretive boldness 
and principle, the other signifying the conservation of institutional 
resources and the settlement of law. 
These maturing, polar visions of Marbury and Brown again collided in 
Bush v. Gore.239 The Justices who overturned the Florida Supreme Court’s 
recount order described their task as fulfilling the “unsought responsibility” 
to interpret and safeguard the Constitution.240 This move was a textbook 
example of mimicry, for Marbury itself had characterized judicial review in 
duty-bound language. 
Turning Marbury back upon his colleagues in the majority, Justice 
Stevens’s sharply worded dissent—joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer—
defended the Florida Supreme Court’s decision as the quintessential 
exercise of judicial review: to “say what the law is.”241 A short-hand that had 
well served the notion of Article III independence was good enough for 
their state counterparts. 
Stevens’s maneuver illustrates the degree to which judges—liberals as 
much as conservatives—now embrace Marbury as a vision of law that is 
decidedly pro-judicial review. Rather than dispute the relevance or propriety 
of Marbury in the contest, Justice Stevens embarked on the same rhetorical 
237. Id. at 993 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Id. (citation omitted).
239. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
240. Id. at 111. As the majority put it:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the
Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution’s
design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their
legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the
process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve
the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to
confront.
Id. 
241. Id. at 128 & n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[The Florida Supreme Court’s] decisions
were rooted in long-established precedent and were consistent with the relevant statutory 
provisions, taken as a whole. It did what courts do . . . .” (citing Marbury)). 
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strategy, pointing out that, according to the same shimmering ideal, the 
Florida court, too, had an obligation to interpret the law. 
At the same time, Brown reappeared in Justice Breyer’s dissent objecting 
to the Court’s decision to grant certiorari and reach the underlying 
constitutional question. Just as Stevens had done in Miller, Justice Breyer 
ceremonially raised Brown to illustrate that the voters’ legal interests did not 
pose any question involving a “basic human right” so as to justify judicial 
intervention.242 Though it is hard to take seriously the suggestion that a 
constitutional violation must rise to the scale of segregation before the Court 
may properly assert jurisdiction, drafting the symbol in the service of the 
passive virtues reinforced the ascendant linkage between Brown and the 
limits of legal power in the judicial imagination. 
On the one hand, we see the rhetoric of duty—that ancient dialogic 
form associated with Marbury—composed to license intervention in a highly 
polarized electoral contest for which political solutions existed. On the 
other, drawing on a newer self-understanding associated with the 
discretionary Court, the dissenters suggested that the dispensation of 
judicial power, polluted by Brown’s worst connotations, was more akin to an 
act of grace. They did not use such terminology, but the implication is hard 
to deny: the Article III power is treated as an extraordinary gift as opposed 
to an entitlement, to be doled out in niggardly fashion. 
This development is a stunning victory for the Bickelian vision of a 
Supreme Court that prizes the “passive virtues,”243 avoiding legal disputes 
where principled adjudication proves impossible—an approach that Gerald 
Gunther famously ridiculed as “100% insistence on principle, 20% of the 
time.”244 Ironically, while Bickel himself urged careful conservation of 
judicial resources in order to tackle epic controversies like the segregation 
cases, contemporary jurists have turned Brown into a towering monument to 
inertia. 
The emerging notion of juridic authority as grace has begun to creep 
into a broad swath of law, from the justiciability doctrines to election law, 
from privacy to equal protection. Furthermore, the ascendant self-
understanding says a great deal about the scale of the modern Court’s 
Olympian detachment from the ordinary workings of law and politics, and 
the level of confidence with which the institution goes about its work. 
Together, the warring notions of juridical prerogative encapsulated in 
the Marbury-Brown dyad lay bare a rather less inspiring image of justice. All 
too often, one is treated to a display of extravagant power or institutional 
 
 242. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was joined by three other Justices who 
favored a remand: Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter. Id. at 144. 
 243. Bickel famously praised judicial non-intervention under such circumstances as 
reflecting “passive virtues.” See BICKEL, supra note 89, at 200. 
 244. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and 
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964). 
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self-regard. Duty and grace—inseparable, nested notions of judicial review at 
war—are now more tightly interwoven in the fabric of the law. But this 
alarming trend in juridic discourse not only cheapens Brown’s achievement, 
it also destabilizes the decision’s place in the canon. 
An effective way to unsettle a symbol’s position in the legal imagination 
is to advance an alluring, alternate network of cultural associations. Since 
the 1950s Brown’s association with Plessy has privileged and glorified Brown. 
The ascendant Marbury-Brown duality has the opposite effect: it acts to 
“break” the circuit of legal meaning conveyed by the Brown-Plessy pair, and 
Brown fares less well by comparison. Much, of course, will depend on how 
persistently the dyad is replicated in the future. The stakes could not be 
higher: the more the decision is used to urge non-intervention by judges, 
the more Brown approaches anti-canonical status, a realm to which the most 
despised cases have been relegated. 
V. PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH-MAKING 
A. BEYOND TEXT-SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS OF LAW 
How has Marbury acquired its tell-tale glow? Why, exactly, has Brown lost 
its luster for those who craft law’s sacred texts? The first possibility—and the 
one most often cited by observers—is that there is something intrinsic to the 
rulings that have produced the feelings that Americans have about them. 
Exemplifying this internal approach, L.H. LaRue turns to an explication of 
“the fictions that have made Marshall persuasive” in an attempt to discover 
why “the national judiciary is strong and self-confident . . . . [and] Marbury 
has the place of honor.”245 
There is certainly much in this account to recommend it. Marbury’s 
language is eminently quotable and universal (offering a treasure trove of 
memorable maxims), whereas every word in Brown is gauged to the precise 
constitutional question at hand and to say as little as possible (the opinion 
declined to overrule Plessy outright, a sleight-of-hand that fooled no one). 
The Justices hoped that minimalist rhetoric in the segregation cases would 
reduce the magnitude of social friction. It is telling that the phrase most 
people associate with the desegregation cases—“all deliberate speed”—
comes not from Brown I, but from Brown II.246 
On the other hand, where the actual tone of Marbury is grandiose 
bordering on arrogant, the rhetoric of Brown is modest, verging on coy. If we 
 
 245. LARUE, supra note 73, at 42–43. 
 246. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II). The phrase that comes in 
as a close second does come from Brown I, popularized in recent years by debates over same-sex 
schools and gay marriage: “separate . . . [is] inherently unequal.” 347 U.S. at 495. Not everyone, 
of course, has found the formulation to be a capitulation to lawlessness. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra 
note 89, at 254 (lauding the formulation for exemplifying Lincolnian tension of principle and 
expediency that “ease[d] the way to [Brown’s] acceptance and effectuation”). 
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did not know how the rest of the canonization story actually unfolded, the 
tenor and substance of the decisions alone might very well have led us to 
very different expectations about which case would become the model for 
judicial behavior. 
If one broadens the lens ever so slightly, the fact of the matter is that it 
was easy for the Marshall Court to strike down the provision of the Judiciary 
Act that conferred original jurisdiction on the Court to issue writs of 
mandamus. Doing so required a relatively costless approval of the emerging 
practice of judicial review,247 achieved through a delicate dance in which the 
Court found that William Marbury was entitled to his commission but no 
actual legal power would be dispensed to force a recalcitrant President to 
deliver it. By comparison, it was exceptionally hard—even unthinkable—for 
the Warren Court to strike a decisive blow for racial equality in the absence 
of a well-formed political consensus at its back. The Justices themselves 
correctly predicted that their collective act would shake the earth and 
unleash the Furies. By these lights, Brown, not Marbury, should have emerged 
as the shining symbol of the power of the federal courts, constitutional 
possibility, justice, and redemption. 
But it has not. All of this confirms that focusing on the actual historical 
controversies presented and the tone of the rulings gets us only so far. 
Whatever is contained in the four corners of the legal decisions cannot 
satisfactorily account for the intensity of feeling and difference of opinion 
we have about these two symbols; they cannot explain their contemporary 
sacramentality. How is it that a case whose facts were mired in the political 
intrigue of the times has emerged as an enduring and powerful sign of 
judicial might; while an unprecedented act of devotion to dismantle and de-
legitimate a racial caste system has fallen so far out of favor among judges? 
Despite the republican revival in legal thought, the model of judicial 
centrality lives on in elite culture. For every skeptical account of judicial 
lawmaking, four vigorous defenses of judicial review rise from the earth.248 
Thus, even if experts reject its most aggressive formulations, most have no 
 
 247. Most scholars accept that judicial review existed at the time of the Founding, though 
there remain pronounced disagreements as to how developed the practice was and how 
exclusive the colonists envisioned the judicial role to be. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 62 (2004). 
 248. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980) (advocating process-perfecting justification for judicial review); LOUIS MICHAEL 
SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2001) (advancing a theory of interpretation that “destabilizes whatever 
outcomes are produced by the political process [and] provides citizens with a forum and a 
vocabulary they can use to continue the argument”); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, 
Defending Judicial Supremacy, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 455 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations “should be taken by all other officials, judicial and non-judicial, as 
having an authoritative status equivalent to the Constitution itself”); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the United States Enters the 21st Century, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53–62 (2004) (criticizing popular constitutionalism). 
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interest in challenging the fundamental principle of judicial review. In such 
a climate, Marbury-based language has considerable space in which to 
flourish. 
It turns out that, by comparison, intellectual support for Brown has been 
tepid from the very start. With its elite constituency offering only grudging 
support, the symbol was ripe for the faith-shaking winds of controversy that 
would soon come. Making matters worse, the basic structure of academic 
inquiry into these rulings has ensured an air of ambivalence about the case 
among each successive generation of lawyers.249 
Within circles inhabited by legal specialists, Brown was hobbled shortly 
after birth as leading thinkers attacked its premises and reasoning.250 To be 
sure, a number of prominent intellectuals rose to Brown’s defense over the 
years,251 but Wechsler’s shade lingered. As a result, the soil itself was too 
poisoned to sustain the flowering of faith among law’s stewards. 
By 1958, Alex Bickel was grimly describing the situation involving racial 
segregation as the “American Algeria,” with the project of reform imposing a 
“heavy drain on the sense of national purpose and integrity. And it was itself 
adrift.”252 More recently, Michael Klarman has argued that Brown added little 
to the dynamic of racial change in the South, which he believes was already 
“too powerful to resist,” and that in the short run, the ruling actually set 
back racial progress by polarizing the forces of progress and 
retrenchment.253 
249. I explore the academy’s role in entrenching legal symbols in Part V.B.
250. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 55 (1958) (“I have never been able to understand
on what basis [Brown] can or does rest except as a coup de main.”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32–35 (1959) (stating that “the 
question posed by state-enforced segregation is not one of discrimination at all,” but instead of 
competing claims to association, and doubting that there is a “basis in neutral principles for 
holding that the Constitution demands that the [plaintiffs’] claims for association should 
prevail”). 
251. To this day, the most famous defenses of Brown remain Charles Black, Jr., The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960), and Louis H. Pollak, A Reply to 
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
252. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, supra note 89, at 255–56. Bickel himself believed that Brown was
a principled decision, defending it from attack by Columbia law professor Herbert Wechsler. At 
the same time, Bickel concluded that the segregation cases showed that expediency and 
flexibility were essential to generating the necessary political and social cooperation to 
implement new legal norms. Id. at 244. 
253. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV.
7, 150 (1994); see also MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 385 (2004) 
(claiming that Brown “radicalize[d] southern politics”). Klarman’s account greatly 
underestimates the role of symbolism in law and politics by demanding evidence of direct 
cause-and-effect before giving symbols their due. Although he admits to Brown’s importance in 
forcing Americans to take sides on the explosive question of segregation, he insists, “[t]hat 
Brown forced people to take a position . . . is not to say that it influenced the position they 
took.” Id. at 365. Moreover, while Klarman acknowledges that the decision was inspiring to 
black activists, he argues that the boycotts and sit-ins “can be explained independently of 
Brown.” Id. at 374. Not only does Klarman reveal a teleological, rather than contingent and 
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Indeed, the tendency of elites to lay everything negative at Brown’s 
doorstep and to minimize the positive aspects of its legacy has only 
quickened and deepened over time. To some, the Warren Court’s later 
decisions extending the rights revolution now seemed to have been 
prefigured by Brown.254 In hindsight, the explosion of public law litigation, 
the excesses of a law-centered view of society, the sharp realignment and 
bitter polarization of the two major political parties, and even many of the 
social ills that afflicted America could be conveniently traced to this act of 
liberation in 1954.255 
It is as if time itself had split in two because of this seismic event, and 
the history of our secular religion would henceforth be understood in two 
epochs: B.B. (“Before Brown”) and A.B. (“After Brown”). In the second 
epoch, Brown is far more likely to be thought of as holding out “a hollow 
hope,”256 signifying the “limits of judicial power,”257 or tantalizingly, 
representing unrealized potential.258 
It is true, of course, that Brown remains important to academic belief 
systems irrespective of what judges and lawyers do—any serious theory of 
constitutional law labors in its long shadow, and must confront its legacy.259 
But here again, many such treatments have a wistful and disappointed 
flavor.260 
 
constitutive, view of history, he demands of symbolism what no symbol can prove. 
 254. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 6 (1982) (“[W]hether they fully realized it or not, the Justices in Brown had committed 
the federal courts to an enterprise of profound social reconstruction.”); Owen Fiss, Foreword: 
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (“As a genre of constitutional litigation, 
structural reform has its roots in the Warren Court era and the extraordinary effort to translate 
the rule of Brown v. Board of Education into practice.”). 
 255. From the vantage point of the close of the 1960s, Alex Bickel later described Brown “as 
the beginning” of a period of great activity by the Warren Court to limit the scope of legislative 
and executive power. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 
(1970). 
 256. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 169 (1992). 
 257. WILLIAM LASSER, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 161–70 (1988). 
 258. Louis Seidman, among others, has made this point in his treatment of equal 
protection law. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE 
LAWS 146 (2003) (“Brown is of continuing significance mostly as a triumphal narrative that, 
ironically, serves as rhetorical support for the racial status quo and, only occasionally, as a dim 
reminder of a constitutional world that might have been.”). 
 259. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 89, at 247–54 (arguing that the “all deliberate speed” 
formula opened up the necessary colloquy between the courts and political branches); RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 379–92 (1986) (defending Brown through Hercules’ moral 
philosophical approach to interpretation); KLARMAN, supra note 253, at vii (“Every teacher of 
constitutional law must ultimately make peace with [it].”). 
 260. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 48–49 (1987); CHARLES OGLETREE, 
WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED 10 (2004). 
TSAI_FINAL.DOC 5/2/2005  10:18 AM 
1154 90  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2005] 
A generation later, we have come full circle. Mark Tushnet, a former 
clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall and a faithful documentarian of the 
NAACP’s civil rights strategy to dismantle segregation, now warns that “we 
ought not celebrate the Supreme Court’s role in Brown as a strong 
demonstration of how the Court can bring about change on behalf of those 
who lack political power.”261 
Likewise, Derrick Bell, once a member of the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund team charged with enforcing desegregation decrees across the land, 
today passionately argues that Americans have been worshipping a false idol 
all along. On reconsideration, Brown was a “magnificent mirage” allowing 
citizens ardently to believe that racial justice had been achieved through 
fidelity to a veneer of formalism.262 Plessy as symbol should be rescued and 
revitalized, Bell insists, so that equality of educational opportunity can be 
realized without the dazzling illusion of integration.263 Bell optimistically 
believes that the reinvigorated vessel of Plessy would draw citizens and 
leaders together in a more lasting community than Brown ever could.264 
Critics and defenders of Brown have arrived in a similar place of 
skepticism. It is hard to escape the feeling that plus ça change, plus c’est la 
même chose. 
B. FABLES OF THE RECONSTRUCTION 
Judges were once students. If law schools are important institutions not 
only passing along technical skills but also nourishing the intellectual soil 
from which belief in law springs, then surely the academy bears its share of 
responsibility for the construction and destruction of legal symbols. For not 
only does the academy serve as a repository of law’s possibilities, it also 
receives individuals who are open to its ministry and eager to enter law’s 
inner sanctum. To fully appreciate the evolution of legal iconography, we 
must go to this wellspring of faith. 
Teachers oversee a strange conversion process that is, by turns, 
empowering and alienating. Students learn that Korematsu265 is a disfavored 
decision for its unflagging deference to assertions of national security and 
fears of treason based on cultural and ethnic characteristics; that Griswold’s266 
 
 261. TUSHNET, supra note 114, at 146. 
 262. BELL, supra note 7, at 4–5. 
 263. See id. at 5, 196 (positing that Brown merely “rewir[ed] the rhetoric of equality,” 
instead of “laying bare Plessy’s white-supremacy underpinnings and consequences”). 
 264. See id. at 20. Put aside the fact that he is largely talking about black and white America, 
and ignores even Justice Harlan’s demeaning terms in speaking about those of Chinese 
ancestry. Looking backward as he does, Bell cannot seem to distinguish Brown I from Brown II; 
nor can he separate Brown from the violence and defiance that followed. 
 265. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 266. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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reasoning is intellectually sloppy; that Dred Scott267 is to be reviled for its 
dehumanization of slaves as property and for inflaming the passions for 
secession and war. By contrast, the High Court’s refusal to enjoin 
publication of the Pentagon Papers is to be celebrated for its vindication of 
First Amendment values.268 Though reactions are never uniform, the early 
impressions students have upon encountering the decisions—negative or 
positive, relevant or peripheral—later affect whether the cases will re-emerge 
in public life, and if so, the general cast these rulings will be given during 
constitutional debate. 
Infatuation with judicial power is modeled from the very start through 
lessons about Marbury. Concomitantly, academic culture has stunted the 
rehabilitation of Brown-as-symbol that might otherwise have taken place. In 
classrooms across the land, law teachers painstakingly present Marbury as a 
foundational case establishing the very basis of federal judicial authority, 
perhaps in reverential tones,269 thereby perpetuating the centrality of the 
legal system.270 Marbury’s gestalt properties pivot around hallowed 
beginnings—our initial awakening to the power and majesty of law, 
absorbed at the start of a professional career. Leading treatises and 
casebooks begin with Marbury as the paradigmatic constitutional case.271 
Advanced courses in public law then revolve around the core issues raised by 
the case, thereby reinforcing the sense that American law springs from this 
exclusive font. 
By contrast, Brown is relegated to a unit on questions of race (or buried 
in a survey of equal protection law) or, worse yet, it is banished to the second 
year of tutelage, when students’ attentions have begun to drift outside the 
ivy-covered walls. The manner in which we teach Brown reinforces the 
impression that it is mostly about ends. It is about Jim Crow’s demise, the 
death of a purely private model of adjudication, and the end to the veneer 
of social cohesion that prevailed through the early 1950s. 
On this last point, the quasi-evolutionary structure of conventional legal 
pedagogy could very well underscore a misleading sense of inevitability in 
267. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
268. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
269. In mostly worshipful terms, Robert McCloskey famously described Marbury as a
“masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Marshall’s capacity to sidestep danger while 
seeming to court it, to advance in one direction while his opponents are looking in the 
another.” ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 40 (1960). 
270. For this reason, there are professors who refuse to teach Marbury at all. See generally
Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) and Why You Shouldn’t 
Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 (2003). 
271. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (2001); CHARLES A. SHANOR,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RECONSTRUCTION 12 (2001); KATHLEEN M. 
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 (2001). But see BREST ET AL., PROCESSES 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 7, 17 (4th ed. 2000) (beginning with controversy 
surrounding a national bank, and the resulting decision in McCulloch v. Maryland). 
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the development of the law. Mistaking chronology for progress, one comes 
to believe that this interpretive path was not only foretold, but appropriate 
and wise. 
If students are invited by teachers to evaluate beginnings at all, it is 
usually to reflect upon deeply troubled beginnings that might be best 
forgotten: the start of a painful and shameful period of institutional 
resistance and bussing, extensive judicial supervision, overreaching, and 
eventual abandonment of the field. At the invitation of casebook authors 
and professors, students probe the pseudo-scientific quality of the doll 
experiment, sense that Brown is indefensible as a matter of strict originalism, 
and reflect upon the “massive resistance” of desegregation orders.272 
Leading constitutional law casebooks then proceed seamlessly from an 
analysis of the analytical vulnerabilities of the Brown decision to: (1) a 
theoretical discussion of the dangers of “judicial supremacy” (leading from 
the language in Cooper v. Aaron), but at the cost of implying that the 
desegregation cases introduced or exacerbated a juricentric view of law; and 
(2) the practical difficulties (perhaps impossibility) of enforcing
desegregation orders.273 This chapter of our constitutional history continues
to receive the most exhaustive treatment in the teaching materials; for no
other constitutional norm are students asked to so deeply question the
efficacy of legal remedies. This is pessimism as pedagogy, pure and simple.
Some critical commentary is, of course, unavoidable and advised, as 
there has never been a phenomenon quite like that of the black experience 
under law in America. And special attention is essential for a fair-minded 
treatment of the topic and for a dutiful exploration of the fine points of 
legal craftsmanship. Yet it is hard to deny that the manner in which law 
teachers organize and present these two cases fosters lasting perceptions of 
these icons.274 
In failing to explore the multifaceted and pernicious systems of slavery 
and segregation in all of their complexity even as we demand special 
attention to race-based remedies, are many of us unwittingly implying that 
the cure was worse than the disease? By considering the special challenges of 
desegregation but spending little time on enforcement difficulties in other 
constitutional settings, are we sending the message to our students that the 
272. Echoing Senator Harry F. Byrd’s (D-Va) famous rallying cry against Brown, Erwin
Chemerinsky titles his section on the enforcement difficulties of desegregation, “Massive 
Resistance.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 603–15 (2001). 
273. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 272, at 605 (“[T]here is no doubt that despite 40 years of
judicial action, school segregation continues. Indeed, racial segregation in American schools 
has been increasing over the past decade.”); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
455–74 (4th ed. 2001) (surveying multiple threads of criticism of Brown and concluding with 
thoughts on the “efficacy of judicial review”). 
274. Some scholars have expressed concerns that legal pedagogy unnecessarily fosters the
hermeneutics of suspicion. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Telling a Less Suspicious Story: Notes 
Toward a Non-Skeptical Approach to Legal/Cultural Analysis, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 95 (2001). 
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game of substantive equality is not worth the candle? Can we really blame 
our students if, at the end of the day, Marbury conjures more attractive 
images of judicial authority and prestige, while Brown sparks feelings of 
disillusionment and despair? 
After all, Marbury, with its sweeping and awe-inspiring rhetoric, appears 
initially to the novice as a grandiose assertion of raw will despite Marshall’s 
protestations, but upon reflection appears justified by principle (either 
because judicial review is deemed essential to the very notion of 
constitutionalism or because it is comforting to see only Marshall’s elegant 
tribute to duty and right). Our teaching of Brown involves an inversion of 
this acculturation process: its spare language initially comes off as 
principled, but looks more like a naked assertion of political will as students 
realize that Brown was repeatedly applied without elaboration. 
By the time the class moves on to other subjects, the damage has been 
done: Marbury as an idol has been uplifted, while Brown, for another 
generation of believers, has been smashed. Having internalized the lesson 
that law and morality are not synonymous, most lawyers will allow a part of 
themselves to admire Brown because it was a righteous outcome or because it 
represents a benchmark of cultural literacy. But familiarity will rarely be 
accompanied by true affection. 
What judges say about this pair of cases and how they deploy them in 
constitutional litigation will continue to dominate—even if they do not 
decisively determine—their cultural meanings. Insofar as the academy has 
anything to say, our way out of this situation lies in a reconstructive 
pedagogy, one that neither romanticizes these extraordinary rulings nor 
devastates them for falling short of perfection. Neutrality might be 
impossible to attain, but there is significant room in the law for historical 
acuity, wisdom borne of experience, and bravery of spirit. 
C. OF CREATION MYTHS AND LEGAL PARABLES
On a fundamental level, each case as it is taught to and absorbed by 
budding lawyers has a kind of analogue in religious myth-making: creation 
stories and parables. Creation myths are folk explanations of an existing 
social reality: how divine power manifested itself in the material world, why 
the sky is blue, how it is that institutions have come into being, and so forth. 
As Milner Ball reminds us, “[s]tories of origin locate law, invest it with 
legitimacy, and so lend it stability.”275 
Like references to our revolutionary origins or the Constitution’s 
founding, mention of Marbury harkens back to the glorious genesis of this 
country and the blessings of judicial power.276 One might imagine the 
275. Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280,
2280 (1989). 
276. See John Marshall and the Genesis of the Tradition, in G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN 
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following characterization of this “original and supreme will” guiding the 
creation of American law:277 “In the beginning was the Word. Through it, all 
things came into being, not one thing came into being except through it. 
What came into being was everlasting freedom, prosperity, and life that was 
the light of men; and light shines in darkness, and darkness cannot 
overpower it.”278 This, at least, is the tale that spills forth from Marbury’s 
contemporary incarnation. Channeled through this symbol, the majestic 
myth of law’s origins has facilitated an aggressive advancement of judicial 
priorities even as it has projected an image of stability and steadfastness. It 
has modeled a great cosmological ladder representing “a structure of 
hierarchy, order, rank, and degree,” with the High Court at the top of the 
cosmos.279 
Religious parables, on the other hand, serve a quite different function: 
although they, too, are constructed to convey deeper truths about the social-
legal order, there is a core ethical component to parables—composed of 
moral judgment, a greater emphasis on human agency, and a warning that 
someone else’s misfortune is to be avoided.280 A parable is structured around 
the comparison of two experiences in which a hidden truth is revealed 
through the narrative device and careful, even repeated, consideration on 
the part of the listener. “The worth of parables as instruments of teaching,” 
we are told, “lies in their being a test of character and in their presenting of 
each form of character with that which, as a penalty or blessing, is adapted 
to it.”281 
Often there is a subversive element to parables, barely detectible 
beneath their mysterious and poetical qualities. The parables spun by Jesus 
of Nazareth were directed at undermining established legal-religious 
practices and restoring lost faith in ways that were decipherable to ordinary 
believers, while holding Roman criticism at bay for as long as it was feasible. 
The technique is aimed at those who “look without seeing and listen without 
 
JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 6 (1976). 
 277. This was Marshall’s memorable personification of higher law: “This original and 
supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective 
powers.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803). 
 278. Cf. John 1:1–5. 
 279. NORTHROP FRYE, MYTH AND METAPHOR: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1974–1988, at 245 (1990); 
see also id. at 246 (“A vision of the cosmos [is] essentially a structure of authority and degree.”). 
 280. A parable has been defined as “a method of speech in which moral or religious truth is 
illustrated from an analogy derived from common experience in life. . . . [T]he teaching of the 
parable is of universal application, suited for all analogous circumstances and for all succeeding 
time.” THE NEW WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE 700–02 (Henry Snyder Gehman ed., 
1970). 
 281. WILLIAM SMITH, A DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE 481, 482 (F.N. & M.A. Peloubet eds., 
1986). 
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hearing or understanding” and borne of a sense that the parable form alone 
can break through.282 
Because of these related attributes, legal parables are powerful vehicles 
for unraveling the cultural and political paradigms undergirding law’s 
dominion. Cryptic yet resonant, parables facilitate legal change 
incrementally. This has certainly been true of Brown over the course of the 
last thirty years, as the decision has both embodied and aided the selective 
reduction of judicial involvement in whole areas of social life. 
If Brown is so often used to fashion a legal parable, what are its lessons? 
Through successive encounters, its hidden truths are revealed to us like a 
bauble turning in the sun. It is a cautionary tale about misdirected energy, 
judicial hubris, a failure of follow-through, the undeniable—perhaps 
irresistible—sway of culture over law, or the emptiness of liberalism or race-
conscious remedies. 
We ignore parables at our own peril, for the ancient parable of the 
lamp teaches that: 
No one lights a lamp to cover it with a bowl or to put it under a 
bed. No, it is put on a lamp-stand so that people may see the light 
when they come in. For nothing is hidden but it will be made clear, 
nothing secret but it will be made known and brought to light.283 
If Marbury-style iconography cloaks interpretation in law’s mystique, Brown’s 
symbolism aims to uncover and proclaim what is truly at stake. 
Law’s spiritual life, in all of its splendor and horror, is refracted through 
these cases. The combined effect of these two icons on the legal imagination 
is a diminished, pragmatic vision of judicial authority divorced from any firm 
conceptions of justice. Marbury is not associated with a strong moral-based 
justification for judicial authority, but rooted in raw bureaucratic power—
the considerations that rule the day are accountability, self-preservation, 
obedience, and efficiency. Marshall’s ringing quotation of Blackstone that 
“where there is a legal right there is also a legal remedy” has been revealed 
to illustrate no truism, as the outcome of that controversy itself plainly 
confirms.284 
It is always risky to attempt predictions based on a reading of signs. The 
history of law, like human history generally, is a set of contingencies. 
Unforeseen events can cause a disruption; a series of small interpretive 
choices and popular reactions can add up to a quiet legal revolution. More 
important, law’s appearance can be deceiving. Still, legal symbols do reveal 
282. “The reason I talk to them in parables,” Jesus reportedly explained with a sudden
clarity of purpose, “is that they look without seeing and listen without hearing or 
understanding.” Matthew 13:13. 
283. Luke 8:16.
284. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). That William Marbury was
told he had a right but that no writ would issue surely offered cold comfort. 
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gestalts—the particular interaction between law’s manifestations and the 
beliefs they express. 
Coupled with Brown’s aura of a seemingly discredited style of social 
engineering overseen by the courts, two possible lessons present themselves. 
One lesson seemingly forecast by the signs is that judicial power is 
efficacious for the reformation of political relationships such as those 
founded on federalism and separation of powers, but less so for 
controversial social projects. 
A second configuration in our symbolic discourse is that it is far easier 
to fulfill a promise of liberty than equality, and that the cleansing force of 
the Judiciary might be more available for projects involving the one than the 
other. The relative commitment of resources required by an interpretive 
outcome often plays a decisive part in the calculus: claims of formal equality, 
like the kind endorsed by Romer v. Evans285 or the dominant understanding 
of Brown, require less institutional monitoring and are more likely to be 
founded upon an existing social consensus or to develop such a consensus 
in the short-run. 
This emerging picture is consistent with the Supreme Court’s grand 
revivification of the constitutional privacy doctrine to encompass sexual 
autonomy.286 Striking down laws that criminalize sexual conduct did not 
require the Judiciary to step far beyond existing cultural mores. Nor did it 
require any significant expenditure of institutional prestige or judicial 
oversight. At the same time that privacy law was reborn, more nuanced 
equality-based claims have faltered, collapsing from the thinness of 
prevailing conceptions of equality and the weakness of the cultural support 
behind them.287 
285. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
286. It may seem puzzling that everyone but O’Connor avoids the equal protection
argument in Lawrence, particularly given Kennedy’s authorship of Romer. Many of the Justices 
surely saw it as an opportunity to strike a blow for freedom under the privacy rationale and 
erase Bowers. On the other hand, the development seems to say as much about a collective 
avoidance of equal protection jurisprudence out of a sense that cultural consensus has not yet 
fully formed in support of a stronger conception of gay equality. At a minimum, the Court 
appeared to be hedging its bets, rallying around a rationale that, if necessary, could be 
distinguished from other situations looming on the horizon (say, gay marriage). For now, then, 
Lawrence and Romer stand as incompletely theorized and un-reconciled ideals of freedom for 
gays and lesbians. 
287. I have in mind not only Gratz, which ascribed decisive constitutional significance to the
University of Michigan’s decision to quantify the role of race in the admissions process, but also 
cases like United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470–71 (1996) (rejecting prima facie evidence 
of equal protection violation), McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1987) (rejecting claim 
of racial bias in administration of death penalty despite evidence of racial disparities), Rice v. 
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000) (ruling that state could not exclude non-Hawaiians from 
voting for trustees for public trust devoted to Native Hawaiians), and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (subjecting benign racial classifications to strict scrutiny). 
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Whatever vision of law legitimated by these legal symbols, do we not 
have an impoverished view of judicial authority? When the road to salvation 
is not open to all, should we not wonder how this will influence the integrity 
of our commitments to one another and, ultimately, whether our 
constitutional faith will endure? 
One thing is certain: legal symbols and the narratives they spin can 
become self-generating after they strike a chord with the citizenry. A 
convergence of cultural and institutional forces imbues a symbol with a 
kaleidoscope of related meanings. Once set in motion, the symbol is far 
easier to sustain than it was to initiate. 
VI. THE END FOR NOW
When Marbury and Brown were decided in their respective eras, each 
marked the affirmative exercise of judicial prerogative amid political or 
social controversy. In our own time, these icons have acquired very different 
meanings in the minds of leading lawgivers. Marbury—cradled and nurtured 
by a bold, modern Supreme Court—has perpetuated a picture of our secular 
religion that is at times sharply vertical, univocal, and awe-inspiring. But it 
would be a mistake to confuse fear and wonder with heartfelt devotion. For 
many jurists, Brown and its promise of equality guaranteed by the courts 
remains a shimmering, unattainable ideal; it stands as a naïve, perilous, 
cacophonous vision of law. What fills this vacuum is a promise of justice that 
might be agreeable to all, but one that is thin, highly formalistic, and 
unlikely to rouse the faithful. 
If I appear disturbed by Marbury’s role in promoting the centrality of 
the Judiciary to our belief in the law and alarmed by Brown’s uncertain place 
in our hearts, it is not because I believe it must always remain so. Legal 
symbols have only the valence that society gives them. What has been 
reduced to rubble may yet be rebuilt. I am reminded of the lyrical words of 
Psalms 118:22, which reflects an abiding faith in foundational change: “The 
stone which the builders rejected has become the cornerstone.”288 
Change can occur, but cultural transformation is hard work. If we are to 
rededicate ourselves to the process of restoration, we must endeavor to 
reconstruct Brown as vigorously as we deconstruct it. If Marbury is ever to be 
toppled from its pedestal, its impoverishment of interpretive fellowship must 
be revealed for all to see. 
What has been done to our legal icons may yet be undone. But it takes 
time. The cultural accretions have occurred over decades. We shall have to 
chip away at the encrusted bodies of these two rulings, little by little. And 
hope for the best. 
288. This saying reflects an enduring Jewish hope in the rebuilding of the Temple—
reflecting both a renewal of law and the community of believers, and it is incorporated into the 
parable of the wicked tenants in Mark 12:10; Matthew 21:42; and Luke 20:17. 
